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A CHANGING WORLD VIEW 
Many curriculum workers have recently become 
concerned with changing cultural patterns in America. 
Some curriculum workers have maintained that America, and 
indeed the world, are in the midst of profound cultural 
changes. Taken,collectively, these changes are referred 
to as cultural transformation. 
Culture is usually defined as the totality of our 
socially transmitted behavior. These would include all 
behavior patterns, arts, beliefs and institutions--in 
short, all aspects of human behavior. To deal with 
cultural transformation, some curriculum workers have 
speculated that new modes of thought are needed. These 
modes of thought, or paradigms as they are often called, 
constitute our outlook on the world. Paradigms of 
thought constitute how we view the world (Kuhn, 1970). 
Paradigms become the filters by-which we perceive 
reality. 
Capra (1982) states that the changes the world is 
undergoing are so profound as to constitute a 
paradigmatic shift. This shift would represent a change 
in conventional thinking. Such changes, according to 
1 
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Capra, will create a worldwide crisis. As an 
introduction to his book, The Turning Point (1982), Capra 
states: 
The new concepts in physics have brought about a 
profound change in our woreld view; from the 
mechanistic conception of Descartes and Newton to 
a holistic and ecological view, a view which I 
have found to be· similar to the views of. mystics 
of all ages and traditions. (p. 15) 
By placing his thesis squarely qn the shoulders of 
the "new science", Capra has given us a method by which 
to examine the emerging world view he speaks of. "New 
Science" refers to the emerging metaphor of quantum 
physics. Thomas Kuhn ( 1970)· explored the meaning of 
paradigms as they applied to scientific thought. In this 
study the terms paradigm and world view are to be used 
interchangeably. 
Paradigm shifts are not·. easy to describe. or to 
classify. Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, states that scientitic 
revolutions are often invi'sible to those participating in 
them. Kuhn (1977) also points out that emerging 
paradigms often develop and exist side by side with the 
dominate (existing) 'paradigm. Taken metaphorically, this 
conception of transformation (paradigm shift) may help to 
explain the rise in interest in transformational theory. 
We sense, perhaps innately, that change is taking place. 
We are, however, often unable to articulate exactly what 
these changes represent. 
Kuhn (1970) seems to warn us"against the expecta-
tions of rapid "change. Americans, particularly, always 
seem to want immediate answers. Kuhn's position clearly 
' ' 
is that change, while very ~eal and substantial, may not 
be apparent to all. Kuhn was speaking of scientific 
paradigm shifts. However, this view of how scientific 
transformation takes place has led many to draw upon 
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Kuhn's work when describing other aspects of our changing 
world. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that Western 
culture is indeed undergoing tremendous change. Sociolo-
gists are not necessary to inform us of the breakdown of 
the American family, the, proliferation of the drug 
culture, rising crime rates and general disenchantment 
with modern society. I contend that these changes are 
significant enough to represent a paradigm shift along 
the lines discussed by Thomas Kuhn. 
A shift in cultural norms poses serious questions to 
curriculum workers. How do we keep up with such 
momentous change? How can curriculum be constructed as 
to have meaning and value? What are the implications of 
cultural transformation on our own personal belief 
systems? 
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Knowledge which is limited and fragmented is not 
likely to have value. Increasingly, the language of 
today seems to-be failing to deal with our world crisis. 
Personally, I have come to bel,ieve -that the language base 
upon whic;h. the· field of cur~,iculum is ·based is too 
limited for. today's- changing culture.· 
' -
Modern curricul~ h~s been constructed on a paradigm 
grounded in Newtoni~n scienc~. The Newtonian paradigm 
has· emphasizeq. :linear and mechanica,l approaches to 
education. The ·Newtonian view of. man as ·a machine has 
tended to alienate large segments of-society. 
Spirituality and intuition are ·no longer acceptable, 
since they do ~ot represent verifiable entities. What is 
needed is a new vision of humankind which will embrace 
such concepts as va~uable and essential to human 
d~velopment. Historical perspective helps us to ~egin to 
formulate such a vision. 
The Role of Historical Perspective 
Soc~ates, Pl,ato, Kant, l{egel, and.Marx have all used 
history' as a means-of predicting_the future. The 
economist and philo'sopher Robert L. Heilbroner ( 19 6 0) 
described the "forces" of history·as neither wholly 
arbitrary nor wholly unpredictable. , Failure to see our 
current predicaments in a historical context, according 
to Heilbroner, dooms us to be forever unprepared to meet 
the challenges of our age. Kuhn (1970) also shares this 
view. 
It is impossible to gain perspective on the emerging 
new science without comparing it to the old Newtonian 
world view. In s,hort, we can only know the new by 
examining the old. 'Historical perspective would seem 
vital to any understanding of transformational theory. 
Historical reference may also help us to deal with 
the confusion and frustration that our current cultural 
crisis has presented us. Capra (1982) believes that a 
broad view is necessary to understand our current 
cultural crisis. He states: 
We have to shift our perspective from the end of 
the twentieth century to a time span encompassing 
thousands of years; from the notion of static 
social structures to the perception of dynamic 
patterns of change. Seen from this perspective, 
crises appear as an aspect of transformation. 
(p. 26) 
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As stated earlier, historical analysis as a means of 
framing the future has been a long standing practice. 
Several twentieth century historians have attempted to 
use history in such a way. Oswald Spengler (1918) in his 
Decline of the West began the modern era of historical 
speculation. By seeking to view world history in its 
total, and not just through a western perspective, 
6 
Spengler sought to explain the world crisis on the eve of 
World War I. 
According to Mazlish (1966), Spengler denied a linear 
development in history, and instead reverted to a form of 
cyclical theory. A cyclical view of history maintains 
that certain themes or patterns of culture repeat 
themselves over.time. It is this cyclical view of 
history that allows us to use history as a frame of 
reference for our own time. At the very least, we can 
examine what history may have to tell us about ourselves. 
Transformational Theory 
Transformational theory, as applied in this study, 
seeks to explore changes which are taking place in 
regards to our view of the world. Capra (1982) describes 
transformational theory as "a struggle to grasp a new 
reality" (p. 15). 
To help grasp this pew reality, many are turning to 
the language of quantum physics. Capra (1988) stated 
that the conceptual shift created by modern physics had 
also impacted the rest of society. In The Tao of Physics 
1975) he states: 
I believe the world-view implied by modern 
physics is inconsistent with our present society, 
which does not reflect the harmonious inter-
relatedness we observe in nature. To achieve 
such a state of dynamic balance, a radically 
different social and economic structure will be 
needed •.• (p. 17) 
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Kuhn (1970) believes that new paradigms emerge when 
old views (methods) fail to,give us adequate explanations 
for certain phenomena. These anomalies, as these 
phenomena are called, have a sort of compounding effect. 
Too many anomalies may cause a shift in thinking. Kuhn 
(1970), gives us the examples of the Ptolemaic 
explanation of the universe giving way to the Copernican 
view and eventually the Newtonian view: 
The state of Ptolemaic astronomy was a scandal 
before Copernicus' announcement. Galilee's 
contributions to the study of motion depended 
closely upon difficulties discovered in 
Aristotle's theory by scholastic critics. 
Newton's new theory of light and color originated 
in the discovery that none of the existing pre-
paradigm theories would account for the length of 
the spectrum, and the wave theory that replaced 
Newton's was announced in the midst of growing 
concerns about anomalies in the relation of 
diffraction and polarization effects to Newton's 
theory. . . (P. 67) 
Thus, we find ourselves today trying to find answers 
using the old Newtonian world view. But there seem to be 
too many anomalies in our society today to find answers 
through this conception of the universe. 
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Again, the new physics ostensibly holds some promise 
for providing answers to these problems. Kuhn (1970) 
also stated that these anomalies can create an atmosphere 
of crisis. He states: 
In all these cases except those of Newton the 
awareness of anomaly had lasted so long and 
penetrated so deep that one can appropriately 
describe the fields affected by it as in a state 
of growing crisis. (p. 67) 
Curriculum theorists everywhere seem to focus on the 
crisis aspects of American education. Educational 
theorists such as Goodlad (1984); Eisner (1988); Apple 
(1990), and Tyler (1949) all refer in their texts to the 
"crisis" facing American education. 
When A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform (National Commission of Excellence, 
1983), was issued, numerous crises were spelled out in 
the document. Indeed, the entire document is peppered 
with the word crisis. It would be no great challenge to 
any student of curriculum to find numerous other examples 
of this crisis mentality. Yet, there seems to be a 
reluctance among curriculum theorists to seek new 
explanations. 
Hayes (1991) points out most of the prominent 
\ 
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curriculum theorists are very much grounded in the 
Newtonian world view. This is to be expected. As Kuhn 
(1970) pointed out to us, "The transfer of allegiance 
from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that 
cannot be forced" (p. 150). He proceeds to point out 
that those (in the scientific f~eld), whose careers are 
tied directly to the older traditions, are to be expected 
to resist change. 
The historian James Burke (1985) states, "All of us 
tend to frame our concept of truth bY, what we know (p. 
10)." We are, in a sense, blinded by our own particular 
_concept of reality. But what if those concepts are _ 
directly challenged?, Must a crisis emerge? 
Petirim A. Sorokin, a prominent sociologist/historian 
who wrote primarily during the period from 1930-1950, has 
postulated that Western culture is in the midst of 
profound change (Sorokin, 1941). Sorokin's central 
thesis was that these changes were inevitable, and had 
brought the Western,world to a crisis stage in its 
development. 
Purpose of the St~dy 
The purpose of this study is to_ examine certain 
historical views on cultural transformation and compare 
them to transformational theories which are based on the 
new science of quantum physics. The study is designed to 
discuss certain key questions, such as: 
1. What concerns did the twentieth century 
cyclical historians, and in particular, 
Petirim A. Sorokin, address in their 
works? 
2. Do the cyclical historians share any 
common ground with current trans-
formational theorists? 
3. As we approach the twenty-first century, 
do the twentieth century cyclical 
historians have anything to tell us that 
might clarify current transformational 
theory? 
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Dobson and Dobson (1981) state that all things which 
impact the child and the school constitute curriculum. 
It is reasonable, in light of this view of curriculum, to 
assume that transformational theory is directly related 
to the field of curriculum. Schubert (1986) states: 
Some hold that curriculum in any society or 
culture is and should be a reflection of that 
culture. The job of schooling is to reproduce 
salient knowledge for the succeeding generation. 
The community, state, or nation takes the lead in 
identifying the skills, knowledge, and apprecia-
tion to be taught. It is the job of professional 
educators to see that they are transformed into a 
11 
curriculum that can be delivered to children and 
youth. ( p. 2 9 ) 
This view of cultural reproduction would seem to be 
widely heid by schoo'l, peo~le ~ However, this view of the 
role of schools in reproducing culture becomes complex 
when one considers the implications of transformational 
theory. If our culture is in transition~ who is to 
determine what should or should not be passed on? 
Again, any questions dealing with cultural 
' 
transformation should be seen as school (curriculum) 
questions. Indeed, William Hea~d Kilpatrick (1926) 
states in his book, Education for a Changing 
Civilization: 
We must look as far into the future as we can to 
catch its problems. It is our duty as teacher to 
prepare the rising generati~n to think that they 
can and will think for themselves, even 
ultimately, if they so·decide, to the point of 
revising or rejecting what we now think. (p •. 60) 
This statement would seem to mirror the crux of the 
transformational di,scussion: Old views, when examined, 
may very well give way to a new view. Educators, if we 
are to follow Kilpatrick's philosophy, must play an 
integral role in evaluating the extent to which our 
society is changing. 
If, in fact, a new world view is emerging which is 
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sufficient to constitute a paradigm shift, it is my 
contention that a study of the factors involved in such a 
shift are of paramount importance to the development of 
curriculum theory. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is divided into five chapters. The 
general purpose of the study is to explore my central 
thesis that Western culture appears to be overly 
dependent on empirical means as a basis for shaping 
reality. Below I have provided a brief description of 
each chapter and its purpose. 
Chapter I 
Chapter I has put forth an explanation of transforma-
tional theory, and how transformational theory may relate 
to the field of curriculum. This chapter has also 
explored the use of history as a means of framing and 
analyzing cultural transformation. The general thesis of 
this study, that Western society is in a state of 
profound change, has been set forth. 
Chapter II 
This chapter serves as a means of introducing the 
historical development of the Newtonian world view. The 
chapter utilizes both primary and secondary sources. The 
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reader is asked to consider the social and philosophical 
implications of our dependence as curriculum theorists on 
the Newtonian model of science. 
Also, the chapter seeks to connect Newtonian science 
to present day curriculum. The major assumption of the 
chapter is that modern curriculum is heavily dependent on 
the Newtonian paradigm for its language base. 
Chapter III 
This chapter introduces the views of the historians 
Giambattista Vice, Oswald Spengler, and Pitirim A. 
Sorokin. The chapter examines their views on Western 
culture. Comparisons are drawn between their various 
views. 
The main focus of the chapter is on the views of 
Pitirim A. Sorokin. Sorokin's work on cultural 
transformation appears to mirror the works of Vice and 
Spengler regarding Western culture. Sorokin's concepts 
allow us to make several speculations regarding Western 
culture in the late twentieth century. 
Chapter IV 
Chapter IV of the study examines the language of 
quantum physics and its implications for developing a new 
philosophical base of the shifting paradigm. The works 
of Einstein, Bohr, Planck and others are examined. The 
1\ 
chapter postulates that the new sciences of quantum 
physics presents us with a suitable number of metaphors 
upon which to build curriculum theory. The chapter 




And finally, Chapter V represents· a direct attempt to 
link the language of quantum physics to school 
curriculum. The chapter postulates that, as metaphor, 
the new science opens up new avenues for curriculum 
development. Additionally, the chapter contains my 
personal speculation(s) on the implications of cultural 
transformation to curriculum theory. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEWTONIAN 
WORLD VIEW 
Our contemporary world view began to take shape in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Capra, 1982). 
The changes in how the world was viewed were profound. 
Capra (1982) describes the shift in thinking as a shift 
from an organic view of the world to a world view which 
emphasized order and reason. Faith and reason were to be 
replaced by prediction and control (Capra, 1982). The 
human mind began to perceive the world in an entirely 
different light. Of course, the changes brought about in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not come 
about easily. For as Randall (1940) states: 
Men are prone to regard the body of their 
beliefs as they do the hills to which they lift 
up their eyes, as fixed and immutable, and all 
departures therefrom as in the very nature of 
the case absurd. (p. 5) 
Eventually, the scientific view of the world, as devel-
oped by the seventeenth century, became the accepted 
"immutable" world view. 
The new view of the universe, once fully accepted, 
15 
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formed an ideological base from which all aspects of 
human existence would be impacte~. Not only scientific 
practice, but religion, the arts, education and philoso-
phy in general were to be impacteq by the emerging scien-
tific paradigm (Bronowski, 1978). 
' ' 
Among the first scientists to put forth the new 
scientific view was Nicolas Copernic~s. Capra (1982) 
sees the scientific revolution as having begun with 
Copernicus. Copernicus repudiated the view that the 
universe evolved around the earth. He, instead, sought 
to prove mathematically that the sun was the center of 
our universe. Kepler, Galilee, Bacon and later Newton 
all formulated mathematical proofs of a heliocentric 
universe (Palmer, 1984). Mathematics rapidly became the 
langtiage of the scientists (Randall, 1940).- Conse-
quently, to be truly scientific something had to be 
subject to mathematical proofs. The universe was now 
being seen as determinate (Randall, 1940). Man's 
position with nature was no longer seen as a partnership 
but more· as one of dominance (Ferguson, 1980)'. With 
science man could control (harness} nature. The organic 
view of the world began to fade away and the determinate 
(control} view took its place (Capra, 1982). It followed 
that the universe was now to be viewed as predictable, 
even simplistic. Copernicus (1539) states: 
After long and careful investigation I have found 
that when the motions of the other planets are 
referred to the circulation of the earth and are 
computed for the revolution of each star, not 
only do the phenomena necessarily follow 
therefrom, but the order and magnitude of the 
stars and all their orbs and heaven itself are so 
connected that in no part can anything be 
transposed without confusion to the rest and to 
the whole universe. (Randall, 1940, p. 52) 
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Thus, Copernicus reveals to us his growing faith that 
this new mathematical science was capable of explaining 
the universe in total. Galilee, Kepler, and most of all, 
Newton were to deliver this message to the rest of the 
world (Palmer and Colton, 1984). 
The Cartesian World View 
Rene Descartes has been described as the founder of 
modern philosophy (Capra, 1982). Descartes was to apply 
to philosophy what had been taking shape in the scien-
tific community. The old Aristotelian view of nature had 
sought to explain nature as having sought perfection in 
its own way. That view was to be replaced by the new 
mathematical explanation of nature. As Galilee states: 
Nature's laws are both regular and simple, every 
one of her acts occurring per la via brevissima, 
by the shortest way. This eternal necessity of 
law is fundamentally mathematical; hence by 
mathematics alone we can penetrate to them, and 
by reason of this mathematical constitution of 
the world, our mathematical knowledge can be 
applied to experience ••• There is no certitude 
where some one of the mathematical sciences can 
not be applied ••• the bird is a machine working 
through mathematical laws. (Randall, 1940, p. 
236) 
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Galilee's view was the prevailing view of science, and 
Descartes was to embrace this view and apply it to 
philosophy. A mathematical interpretation of nature was 
at the heart of Descartes' philosophy. In short, he 
sought to build a philosophy as certain as mathematics 
(Bronowski, 1978). 
Descartes determined that nature must be explained 
mechanically, without the aid of forms, ideas or univer-
sals (Frost, 1942). He, then, has placed the mechanistic 
metaphor as his central philosophical thesis. Descartes 
felt that substance was the key to understanding the 
universe (Frost, 1942). Descartes states that, "at the 
base of everything in the universe, of all bodies, is 
substance" (Frost, 1942, p. 32). Descartes was to con-
ceive two types of substances, mind and body. Mind and 
body, according to Descartes, both were independent of 
each other. Both, however, stemmed from God, the 
absolute substance (Frost, 1942). 
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By separating the mind and the body, Descartes had 
allowed his philosophical view of nature to proceed 
unhindered by metaphysical questions. Metaphysics was a 
product of the substance of mind, nature was of body 
substance. Randall (1940) states: 
To Descartes thenceforth space or extension 
became the fundamental reality in the world, 
motion the source of all change, and mathematics 
the only relation between its parts ... He had made 
of nature a machine and nothing but a machine; 
purposes and spiritual significance had alike 
been banished. (p. 241) 
By removing all mystical aspects from his world view, 
Descartes had begun the process of replacing the organic 
view of nature from philosophy. So Randall (1940) puts 
it, "the whole working out of mechanical physics in the 
next two centuries is but the development of this idea" 
(Randall, 1940, p. 242). But what of the other half of 
Cartesian dualism, the mind? Descartes had not excluded 
God from his philosophy. On the contrary, God was the 
essence of all substance. However, whether wittingly or 
not, Descartes had laid the foundations for a conception 
of the universe that would increasingly ignore the 
spiritual as a genuine scientific concept. God would 
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eventually have no place in the scientific world. 
By following the method of Descartes, scientists 
could now pursue their studies of nature without concern-
ing their work with the mind (Frost, 1942). This dis-
tinction between the material world and the mental (mind) 
world would have implications beyond science. As the 
belief in certainty as the proof of scientific knowledge 
increased, so did the application of this philosophy to 
other areas. To Descartes this vision of certainty 
extended to all fields of learning (Capra, 1982). 
In summary, it can be said. that Descartes represents 
a break from the intellectual tradition of European phil-
osophy (Neill, 1949). Religion (and to an extent even 
reason itself) was relegated to a realm outside of 
science. Philosophers and philosophy became less impor-
tant. Descartes had placed the mind as being central to 
human existence and he has the mind operating separately 
from the body (Gardiner, 1985). With this separation 
modern science would build its foundation. Descartes had 
opened the way for such thinkers as Isaac Newton. 
The Newtonian World View 
Randall (1940) describes Descartes' cosmic picture as 
merely a sketch. A framework which was still in need of 
being filled in. Isaac Newton was the brilliant mind who 
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completed the picture Descartes had drawn. Newton's laws 
were able to provide explanations. Real quantifiable 
explanations that were not hindered by the doubts of 
Descartes. As Pagels (1982) states: 
Newton's laws brought order to the visible world 
of ordinary objects 'and events like stones 
falling, the motion of planets, the flow of 
rivers and the tides. The primary charac-
teristics of the Newtonian world view were its 
determinism--the clockwork universe determined 
from the beginning to the end of time. (p. 64) 
This ordered mathematical universe espoused by Newton was 
in part the realization of Descartes' dream of a complete 
mathematical philosophy. Newton's formula(s) seemed to 
have the answers to everything. 
Newton's basic theory centered on the laws of motion 
(Palmer and Colton, 1984). He was able to apply both 
inductive and deductive reasoning to form a coherent 
interpretation of how the universe operated (Capra, 
1982). Newton's laws of motion were fixed and immutable 
(Capra, 1982). In the Newtonian view, time and space 
were fixed entities (Pagels, 1982). God was seen as 
having set the universe in motion~ and once having done 
so, sat back to watch it work (Capra, 1982). In such a 
scheme man was now able to predict the position of 
planets, etc. with virtual certitude (Capra, 1982). 
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Since the physical properties of the universe were seen 
as part of the body Descartes had described, it followed 
that the universe was no longer to be viewed from a 
metaphysical viewpoint. These were concrete, observable 
phenomena being discussed by Newton. Newton (1642-1727) 
developed a cardinal rule which promoted the concept of a 
universe being governed by natural causes only. He 
states: 
We are to admit no more causes of natural things 
that such as were both true and sufficient to 
explain their appearances. Therefore, to the 
same natural effects we must, as far as possible, 
assign the same causes ... For since the qualities 
of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we 
are to hold for universal qualities of all bodies 
whatsoever ••. we are certainly not to relinquish 
the evidence of experiments for the sake of 
dreams and vain fictions of our own; nor are we 
to recede from.the analogy of nature, which uses 
the simple, and consonant with itself. (Capra, 
1982, p. 66) 
An analysis of Newton's famous rule can tell us much 
about his views. "We are to admit to more causes of 
natural things", indicates that we are not to accept 
metaphysical explanations for how nature operates. There 
will always be a natural (mathematical) explanation to be 
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had. "The evidence of experiments" ... leads us to the 
conclusion that truth can only be obtained by experimen-
tal method. We are warned not to waste time following 
dreams. Our intuition (vain fiction) will surely mislead 
us. Nature is described by Newton as simple. Follow 
simple mathematical calculations and the truth of nature 
will be revealed. 
Newton's principal rule became the guiding force for 
science (Randall, 1940). Newton's method, an analysis by 
observed facts and the mathematical formulas set forth by 
him, came to be associated with true science (Randall, 
1940). 
Newtonian mechanics were used with tremendous success 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Capra, 
1975). Newton's system was capable of allowing 
scientists to make some very accurate observations about 
the universe (Palmer and Colton, 1984). This success 
encouraged the application of Newtonian mechanics to 
other areas of the human experience. Soon all the social 
sciences were being impacted by the scientific revolu-
tion. Capra (1982) refers to the social scientists' 
claim to having discovered "social physics." In short, 
credibility was linked to the extent by which something 
could be submitted to rational experimentation. The 
modern mind, by the end of the nineteenth century, was 
immersed in the Newtonian world view. 
The Impact of the Newtonian 
View on Culture 
John Locke (1690) perhaps did more than anyone to 
extend Newtonian logic to the social sciences. Capra 
(1982) states: 
Locke attempted to reduce the patterns observed 
in society to the behavior of its individuals. 
Thus he proceeded to study the nature of the 
individual human being, and then tried to apply 
the principles of human nature to economic and 
political problems. (p. 69) 
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Locke (1690) in An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, contended that all of our ideas come from 
experience, either from sensation or by reflection 
(Magill, 1990). Our ideas, the empirical method set 
forth by Locke, have had a profound impact on the social 
sciences. Locke stressed experience (and experimenta-
tion) as the basis of true knowledge; even to the ext~nt 
of writing extensively on how to acquire certain skills 
(Phillips, 1987). Positivism, that branch of the social 
sciences that believes the object of science must be only 
what we can positively know, can be seen as having 
derived its philosophical base from the empirical views 
of Locke (Randall, 1940). The empiricists grew less and 
less tolerant of those views which could be seen as 
irrational. Randall (1940) states: 
The empiricists sought to remove the dead weight 
of the past by discovering the natural history of 
the origin and growth in the mind of the ideas 
connected with objectionable and outworn beliefs 
and customs. They tried to show up the 
irrational origin of things which they hated. 
(p. 272) 
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Thus anything that could be labeled irrational was unac-
ceptable to the empiricists. Religion, morals, politics, 
etc. were exposed by,the empirical school as being pro-
foundly irrational. Hume (1711-1776) took this view to 
its extreme by stating, "no knowledge for which some 
antecedent sense impression was not discoverable could 
claim any validity" (Frost, 1942). Increasingly, faith 
was being replaced in the modern world of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century. In its place was belief, belief 
in the scientific method. The emphasis on mathematics as 
the basis for philosophical thought reached its peak in 
the twentieth century with the Logical Positivists. 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) has often been described as 
the father of positivism (Windelband, 1958). Comte felt 
that the scientific revolution had not been introduced to 
other fields of human inquiry sufficiently. He sought to 
apply science to social, political, moral, and religious 
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thought (Stumpf, 1975). Comte believed that knowledge 
could only be obtained through observation and experienc~ 
(Frost, 1942). It was the role of man to see what was 
required and experiment to obtain the required results. 
As Comte states, "any proposition which does not admit to 
ultimately being reduced to a simple enunciation of fact, 
special or general, can have no real or intelligible 
sense" (Stumpf, 1975, p. 373). Thus, Comte tells us that 
facts, observable facts, are what counts. He has laid 
the groundwork for pragmaticism, in that the only way 
truth can be obtained is through this sense experience. 
Later philosophers, William James, John Dewey and others 
were greatly influenced by the sociology of Comte 
(Phillips, 1987). The basic principle that positivism 
was to build on was that something has meaning only if it 
can be empirically verified. So Phillips (1987) states: 
The principle they hit upon stated that something 
is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable 
empirically (i.e. directly, or if charitable, 
indirectly, by observation via the senses), or is 
a tautology of mathematics or logic. This has 
been parodied as "if it can't be seen or 
measured, it is not meaningful to talk about". 
(p. 39) 
Positivism rejects metaphysical explanations as 
unknowable and therefore not verifiable. Popper (1968) 
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states that the goal of the positivists was to render 
metaphysics as meaningless nonsense. The impact of the 
positivist philosophy on the social sciences appears to 
have been profound. The positivist approach brought a 
degree of unity to the social sciences. Good sociolo-
gists, historians, etc. were expected to follow certain 
methodologies to be accepted. As O'Connor (1964) states: 
The Logical Positivists contributed a great deal 
to the social sciences. They brought to philo-
sophy an interest in cooperation ... They adopted 
high standards of rigor ... and they tried to 
formulate methods of inquiry that would lead to 
commonly accepted results. (p. 508) 
The accepted results would be those based upon scientific 
inquiry. 
Logical positivism perhaps revealed its part with the 
followers of Bertrand Russell in the twentieth century. 
Russell sought to bring all philosophical language into 
the realm of mathematics. Russell chided many a 
philosopher for lacking the proper mathematical skills 
(Phillips, 1987). 
It is logical to conclude that the Newtonian world 
view directly shaped Western culture from the late seven-
teenth century forward. Virtually every aspect of West-
ern society came to be influenced by the scientific 
method laid forth by the Newtonian view. Capra (1982) 
has explored the impact of Newtonian physics on medical 
practice and economic strategy. Dubas (1968), Ferguson 
(1980), and Capra (1982) all indicate that our view of 
the environment has been structured by Newtonian con-
cepts. 
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Capra (1982) feels that medical practice has adopted 
the reductionist tools of the Cartesian model. He 
states: 
The biomedical model is firmly grounded in 
Cartesian thought. Descartes introduced the 
strict separation of mind and body, along with 
the idea that the body is a machine that can be 
understood completely in terms of the arrangement 
and functioning of its parts. (p. 140) 
Knowles (1977) in his book Doing Better and Feeling 
Worse, has written extensively on the failure of modern 
medicine to concern itself with criteria other than 
physical ones. Capra (1982) cites the tendency of medi-
cal practitioners to use a mechanistic approach when 
discussing prevention of disease. Ferguson (1980) sees 
modern medicine as having excluded the subjective realm 
from medical practice. Physicians are likely to view the 
mechanistic model as being the most expedient method of 
practice. Lyng (1988) has directly related the dominant 
medical model of today to the mechanistic mind set forth 
by the Newtonian paradigm. Ferguson (1980) uses the 
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following descriptions to describe the Newtonian paradigm 
for medicine: 
1. efficient; 
2. primary interV'ention; 
3. mechanistic (boqy as machine); 
4. separateness (mind and body); 
5. quantitative; 
6. environmental prevention. (p. 247-248) 
These descriptions of the current medical paradigm clear-
ly indicate how the language of Cartesian-Newtonian 
paradigm has come to influence everyday life. Ferguson 
(1980) has shown that the mind body duality concept is 
dominant within the medical community. Lyng (1988) has 
also suggested that medicine< .i~ grounded in the concept 
that mind and body are separate. Accepted medical 
practice is that which follows a prescriptive procedure 
based on patients being seen as machines who must be 
fixed (Ferguson, 1980). 
Perhaps nowhere has the influence of the Newtonian 
paradigm been more apparent than in the area of economic 
philosophy. Since the eighteenth century, economic 
philosophy has tended to emphasize progress as a measure 
of success (Capra, 1982). Adam Smith (1776), often 
considered to be the father of modern capitalism, 
emphasized the application of natural law to economic 
theory (Heilbroner, 1960). To Smith, if there were 
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ordered laws which governed the universe, there had to be 
set principles which could result in maximum economic 
progress (Smith, 1776). Smith took a reductionist view 
towards economic theory. He emphasized the division of 
labor, and focused on the production levels in his 
analysis (Knoles and Snyder, 1960). 
Smith's message was one of extreme individualism. 
Economics was made a science by Smith, and the science 
was grounded in the Newtonian model. Smith's labor 
theory of value stressed that a product only has value 
based upon the amount of labor that has gone into it 
(Heilbronner, 1982). Worth or value became associated 
with materialistic factors. The science of economics 
developed around these materialistic factors. Capra 
(1982) states: 
With the Scientific Revolution and the Enlight-
enment, critical reasoning, empiricism, and 
individualism became the dominant values, 
together with a secular and materialistic orien-
tation that led to the production of worldly 
goods and luxuries, and to the manipulative 
mentality of the Industrial Age •.. the theorizing 
about a set of specific economic activities--
production, exchange, distribution, money-
lending--which suddenly stood out in sharp relief 
and required not only description and explanation 
31 
but also rationalization. (p. 195) 
Quantitative means (mathematics) became the primary 
means of evaluating the success or failure of economic 
policy. The use of deterministic language, is by no means 
limited to capitalism. Socia'!ism, which began to develop 
rapidly in the eighteenth and nineteenth c~nturies, also 
made use of scientific principles in its philosophy. 
Capra (1982) believes that Karl Marx made much use of 
scientific jargon in the development of his communist 
philosophy. Capra (1982) states: 
Marx was very concerned about being scientific, 
using the term "scientific" constantly in the 
description of his critical approach. Accord-
ingly, he often attempted to formulate his 
theories in Cartesian and Newtonian language. 
(p. 208) 
Marx's dialectic is very linear in nature. It seeks 
to explain the course of human history as having led 
directly to the communist state (Capra, 1982). Marx 
seems to be very proud of the fact that Marxism can be 
promoted as a science. If marxism is a science, it is a 
science directly influenced by the Newtonian paradigm. 
Capra (1982) indicates that this mathematical deter-
ministic approach to economics has led to an excessive 
reliance on growth. Growth, which can generally be 
viewed as a logical consequence of linear theory in 
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general, has become the goal of economics. To become 
bigger is to become better. The role of the economist is 
generally viewed as that of an analyst who can predict 
certain growth or decline patterns. In the United States 
the well being of our nation is measured by economic 
progress {Toffler, 1990). To a large extent, science 
theory in the United States has been built on the 
economic model. Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) 
advanced the theory of scientific management (Current, 
Williams, Frieda!, Brinkley, 1987). Scientific man-
agement stressed the need for modernization of the 
manufacturing process. Subdivisions of tasks, new 
machines, proper management, production efficiency and 
control all became elements of this new philosophy 
(Current, Williams, Frieda!, Brinkley, 1987). Scientific 
management was very much in keeping with the philosophies 
of science and progress. No area of American culture was 
impacted more by this scientific view than our schools. 
The Impact of the Dominant 
Paradigm on Curriculum 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) in his work The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions has stressed the fact that scien-
tists tend to identify themselves with the existing 
paradigm that is most comfortable for them (almost always 
the dominant paradigm). Dobson, Dobson, and Smiley 
(1991) believe this is true of curriculum theorists as 
well: 
Curricular workers, through their induction into 
a professional culture, usually demonstrate 
allegiance to an identifiable paradigm. 
Curriculum theorists share knowledge construction 
bases and convert to common rules and standards 
for theorizing. (p. 41) 
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As do scientists, curriculum theorists also seem to seek 
the most comfortable language base from which to operate. 
It is logical for curriculum workers to espouse theory 
based upon the dominant paradigm. Many suggest that the 
Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm has dominated curriculum 
development for most·of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Many have cited the emphasis schools have 
placed on production as an example of the dominant 
Newtonian paradigm at work. Students, teachers and 
administrators tend to be viewed as parts of the factory. 
And the goal of the factory· is to produce a product that 
' ' 
will enable society (particularly the economy) to grow 
and prosper. The student tends to be seen as simply a 
part to be reduced and scrutinized. Ferguson (1982) sees 
the school curriculum as reductionist in nature. 
Kliebard (1972) has used the industrial metaphor to 
describe school curriculum. Dobson, Dobson, and Koetting 
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(1985) have also decried the industrial metaphor in their 
discussion of school curriculum. Simple evidence exists 
to warrant the use of the industrial metaphor in describ-
ing curriculum, and for the prevalence of the Cartesian-
Newtonian paradigm in all aspects of school curriculum. 
Oliver (1989) has stated: 
Reforms 'in schooling and curriculum have been and 
are constructed within ~he modern paradigm: how 
do we remove the oppressive obstacles of our 
feudal past, e.g., slavery, racism, autocratic 
government,. unequal chances in life; how do we 
improve the liberal democratic state as the 
central institution of governance; how do we make 
work more efficient and rewarding in the factory 
and office building? ... framed in these ways, 
education is a specialization function, its 
problems technical problems. (p. 30) 
Oliver's view of curriculum as technologically based and 
as a product of our dominant culture, is one shared by 
many curriculum theorists. Hayes (1991) has demonstrated 
that many curriculum theorists believe the Cartesian-
Newtonian model to be the dominant model for curriculum 
theorizing. 
The application of scientific management to curricu-
lum development has manifested itself in many ways. Pri-
marily, it has led to the attempts to analyze curriculum, 
to break it down for specific study. As Tanner and 
Tanner (1975) state: 
... the notion of curriculum as a production 
system has been embodied in the doctrine of 
specific "behavioral" objectives; behaviorism and 
the theory of operant condition; developments in 
instructional technology, including systems 
analysis; performance contracting and account-
ability. (p. 27) 
This structured view of curriculum was advanced by 
Franklin Bobbitt as early as 1918 (Tanner and Tanner, 
1975). Bobbitt (1918) was attempting to reduce 
curriculum to a series of practical endeavors. This 
method of objectivising school curriculum was based 
directly on production models of business and industry 
(Tanner and Tanner, 1975). Bobbitt (1918) states: 
Curriculum making is the job of the "educational 
engineer" ... In its simplest forms it involves the 
analysis of definite operations, to which the 
term job analysis is applied, as in the analysis 
of the operations involved in running a machine. 
(p. 32) 
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Thus Bobbitt's How to Make a Curriculum had brought the 
Newtonian notion of the world as machine squarely home to 
the schools. Tanner and Tanner (1975) cite the influence 
of the behavior theorists such as B.F. Skinner on school 
curriculum. Their list of Skinner objectives include: 
1. gaining and controlling attention; 
2. learner outcomes; 
3. recall; 
4. learning tasks; 
5. essential performance; 
6. feedback; 
7. appraisement of performance. (p. 28) 
Despite denial on the part of many behaviorists, the 
above list clearly indicates an emphasis on the linear 
and mechanical aspects of human behavior. In this case 
the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm has provided the lan-
guage base for structuring this type of curriculum. 
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Similarly, recent curriculum theorists have advocated 
a rational view for curriculum development. Tyler (1949) 
advocated a planned school curriculum based upon specific 
objectives. He states: 
All aspects of the educational program are really 
means to accomplish basic educational purposes. 
Hence, if we are to study an educational program 
systematically and intelligently we must first be 
sure as to the educational objectives aimed at. 
(Tyler, 1949, p. 3) 
We see in Tyler's position the pure rational approach to 
curriculum. In order for curriculum to be adequate it 
must serve certain purposes and follow a systematic path. 
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As with Bobbitt's industrial model, Tyler places a great 
deal of emphasis on the product. What is to be produced 
and for what purposes become the essential question 
within the Tyler model. In case ther~ is doubt as to the 
emphasis Tyler (1949) places on objectives within the 
curriculum, consider this following statement: 
We are devoting much time to the setting up and 
formulation of objectives because they are the 
most critical criteria for guiding all the other 
activities of the curriculum matter. (Tyler, 
1949, p. 62) 
Tyler has shown us that all other criteria mean little 
when compared to objective standards. We can infer from 
this that all subjective means of implementing curriculum 
must be secondary (if considered at all). Clearly, the 
scientific method (objectivity) dominates the Tyler 
method. 
Other curriculum theorists such as Madeline Hunter 
have also promoted the idea of an orderly objective 
curriculum (Doll, 1989). Doll sees in this methodology 
an attempt to directly apply Newtonian logic to curricu-
lum. He states: 
Direct correlations can be made between Madeline 
Hunter's or Ralph Tyler's notions of an orderly 
curriculum with ends preset and Newton~s idea of 
a stable universe with planets rotating around 
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the sun in perfect harmony. (p. 244) 
The application of Newtonian logic to curriculum by Tyler 
and Hunter seems to fit in with Kuhn's (1970) position 
that scientists, and in this case curriculum theorists, 
tend to view the existing paradigm as an absolute. He 
tells us: 
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to 
paradigm is a conversive experience that cannot 
be forced. Lifelong resistance, particularly 
from those whose productive careers have com-
mitted them to an older tradition of normal 
science ••. The source of resistance is the assur-
ance that the older paradigm will ultimately 
solve all its problems. (pp. 150-151) 
The popularity of Hunter and the back to basics movement 
would indicate a reluctance,on the part of modern curri-
culum theorists to depart from the dominant paradigm. 
Similarly, the rush to the behaviorist's views of Kerner 
and Poph~ in the sixties and seventies, may be viewed as 
an attempt to solve curriculum problems through the 
comfortable language of the dominant paradigm (Doll, 
1989). Doll (1989) states: 
Connections can also be made between B. F. 
Skinner's or James Popham's view of expressing 
learning in discrete, quantifiable and 
linear units and Newton's approach to the 
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calculus. (P· 244) 
Even those theorists who have generally been associ-
ated with "progressive" aspects of education can be 
listed directly as adherents to the dominant scientific 
(Newtonian) paradigm. Eliot Eisner (1985) has identified 
Dewey and Thorndike with a reliance upon scientific 
technology in their theories (Brown, 1989). Indeed, any 
examination of Dewey's language leads us back to a 
scientific perspective. Inquiry, scientific inquiry, is 
the key to understanding both Dewey and Thorndike. Brown 
(1989) quotes Eisner as having identified these men with 
the model approach to curriculum. According to Eisner, 
this approach has effectively precluded other views from 
entering the curriculum debate (Brown, 1989). 
The search for explanations has always been an 
identifying characteristic of the Cartesian-Newtonian 
paradigm. Curriculum theorists seem to seek explanations 
in much the same way. As Dobson and Dobson (1985) have 
pointed out, it was believed that the stockpiling of 
knowledge about how the world works would eventually 
produce adequate explanations. Curriculum theorists find 
their very language rooted in a particular philosophy 
(Dobson, Dobson, and Koetting, 1985). The Cartesian-
Newtonian world view has been so dominant as to touch 
virtually every aspect of twentieth century thought. 
Based upon this supposition, it is easy to see the impact 
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of Newtonian logic on curriculum. 
Historical Perspectives 
The cyclical historians .can be defined as those 
historians who helieve that history runs in definite 
patterns or cycles. One such historian, Petirim A. 
Sorokin, came to the belief that cultures develop in 
distinct ways and come and go in periods of three to six 
hundred years. Sorokin theorized that the culture 
Western society has been based on, that of the Newtonian 
world view, is in its last stages of existence. Sorokih 
maintained that Western culture has become too material-
istic and has simply worn itself out (Sorokin, 1941). It 
is to Sorokin and the cyclical historians that we can 
turn to explore the implications of Newtonian science on 
Western culture. 
CHAPTER III 
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION: CYCLICAL 
HISTORY AND THE WORKS 
OF PETIRIM SOROKIN 
Culture can be difficult to define in specific terms. 
Some would define culture in terms of institutions, 
customs, and through the activities of people's daily 
lives (Verene, 1970). Others would view culture in a 
more general sense, seeking to define culture in terms of 
the culture of a nation or world cultures (Verene, 1970). 
The American Heritage Dictionary (1970) defines culture 
as follows: 
Social and intellectual information. The totality 
of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, 
beliefs, institutions, and all other products of 
human work and thought characteristic of a 
community or population. A style of social and 
artistic expression peculiar to a society or class. 
(p. 321) 
If one accepts all of the above definitions as aspects of 
culture, we can see some contrast. Verene (1970) con-
trasts the view of culture as, "that of a particular 
society and that of the meaning of human existence 
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itself" (p. 1). Those who view culture in a limited way 
(through a societal view) may characteristically be 
ignoring the broader (more holistic) view of culture. To 
limit one's view of culture is to fix one's self in 
current trends or patterns. Our current linear view of 
history tends to limit us to a specific view of culture 
(Heilbroner, 1960). Burke (1985) has indicated that we 
tend to frame knowledge (and thus culture) around 
prevailing theory. Theory then dictates what we know. 
Anything new or unknown must be defined in terms of the 
structure of the theory (Burke, 1985). He states: 
The implications of this are that, since the 
structure of reality changes over time, science 
can only answer contemporary questions about 
reality defined in contemporary terms and 
investigated with contemporary tools. Logic is 
shaped by the values of the time. (p. 336) 
Thus, many tend to dismiss older cultural values as 
having very little meaning to our own particular time or 
situation. Varenne (1970) calls for a broader view of 
culture, one that does not limit our views of what is 
good or bad to contemporary notions alone. As has been 
mentioned, the Newtonian world view tended to promote a 
progressive linear view. Old views tended to be dis-
missed as outdated or even as nonsense by the Newtonian 
scientists (Burke, 1985). By the eighteenth century, The 
Age of Enlightenment, the measure of cultural value was 
shifting from a focus on the past to a view that was 
centered around the new Newtonian science (Palmer and 
Colton, 1984). 
Oliver (1989) has argued that our modern view of 
culture is inadequate to explain our current problems. 
He states: 
The modern statement of the human condition--its 
blessings, its problems, and the resolutions of 
these problems within its own terms--is grossly 
inadequate to explain our contemporary misgivings 
about how we feel, what we are about, where we 
are going as modern people. (p. 7) 
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Oliver implies that the modern view is too limiting 
and he calls for a more complex view of culture. By 
modern, Oliver means that restricting our views to that 
of modernity has led to an over emphasis on technical 
aspects of knowing (Oliver, 1989). This over emphasis on 
technology he calls the technical fallacy (Oliver, 1989). 
To Oliver such a technical view is self defeating and 
actually inhibits our ability to solve problems within 
our culture. Oliver (1989) calls for cultural balance. 
To obtain cultural balance it is necessary to think 
historically and begin to look at other cultures, past 
and present, for meaning (Oliver, 1989). He states: 
Our thesis is that healthy culture requires that 
we apprehend, at least in some dim way, a sense 
of universe/nature/culture that embraces a range 
and balance of metaphors, metaphors which extend 
our ontological feelings toward reflective 
conscious meaning. (p. 20) 
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Pitirim A. Sorokin (1950) dealt specifically with the 
fragmentation of modern society (Oliver, 1989). Sorokin's 
historical research into culture and its various aspects, 
represents one of the most exhaustive historical studies 
of the twentieth century (Allen, 1963). Sorokin placed 
culture in two broad categories, the Sensate and the 
Ideational (Oliver, 1989). Sensate culture placed its 
values on sensory perception (that which can be ascer-
tained as true through the senses), while the Ideational 
culture placed its criteria for truth on God and God's 
words for its inspirations (Sorokin, 1950). Sorokin also 
identified a third type of culture known as the Integral. 
The Integral culture was seen as having shared aspects of 
both the Sensate and Ideational cultures (Oliver, 1989). 
Sorokin's views' represent a synthesis of sorts of the 
views of earlier cyclical historians. Although many of 
his views seem to be wholly original, it seems clear that 
he built his philosophy from cyclical theory dating as 
far back as the early eighteenth century. It is my 
contention that by examining the roots of cyclical 
history, we derive an understanding of Sorokin's views 
and the implications those views hold for contemporary 
humankind. 
Forerunners to Sorokin: 
Vico and Spengler 
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In general the theory of cyclical history implies 
that events occur in certain cycles and contain certain 
similarities to each other (Weiner, 1973). The belief in 
historical cycles can be traced as far back as to Babylo-
nian times and to the philosophy of Plato (Weiner, 1973). 
Aristotle had put forth the idea of degeneration within 
governments (Heilbroner, 1960). According to Aristotle 
governments began as monarchial entities, then degenerat-
ed into oligarchies, then to tyrannies, and eventually to 
a democracy (Wiener, 197.3). Although it does not appear 
that Aristotle meant that these cycles had to occur, he 
infers that extraordinary events could lead to their 
repeating themselves (Wiener, 1973). Thus, through the 
works of the Ancients groundwork was laid for the deyel-
opment of a more encompassing theory of cyclical history. 
By the eighteenth century such a theory was developed by 
Giambattista Vico. 
Views of Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) 
Vico has been described as one of the greatest 
Italian philosophers (Copleston, 1985). Vico was the 
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first to attempt to develop a universal history based 
upon empirical grounds alone (Nash, 1969). Vico was to 
depart from the prevailing view of history as linear in 
nature. To Vico history was at times linear, but also 
followed certain cyclical patterns. Nash (1969) has 
called Vice's view a spiral pattern of history. Vico was 
to emphasize that history had a place in and of itself. 
It could exist without having to defer to science. Vico 
emphasized the importance of the arts in evaluating the 
past and the future. He decried the emphasis that was 
being placed on Newtonian science at the expense of the 
study of humane letters (Mazlish, 1966). Vico warned' 
historians about undervaluing linguistics, mythology, and 
tradition when writing history (Nash, 1969). These 
positions put him in direct conflict with the Cartesians. 
Descartes had stated: 
The overcurious in the customs of the past are 
generally ignorant of those of the present. 
Besides, fictitious narratives lead us to imagine 
the possibility of many events that are impos-
sible, and even the most faithful histories, if 
they do not wholly misrepresent matters, or 
exaggerate their importance to render the account 
of them more worthy ..• hence the remainder does 
not represent the truth. (Nash, 1969, p. 27) 
Hence it is little wonder that in the scientific 
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atmosphere of the seventh century, that Vico's call for a 
history based on adherence to factors other than scien-
tific method was largely rejected. Vico does not reflect 
knowledge, for he believes that man has created his own 
knowledge. Man can have knowledge of that which he has 
created (Coplest~:m, 1985). But what he does reject is 
the Cartesian view that implies that nature can be known 
through the mathematical and physical sciences (Nash, 
1969). God, to Vico, was the only entity that could 
fully know nature. As Flint (1884) states: 
Vico implies that there is no human truth outside 
of human knowledge, just as there is no divine 
truth outside of divine knowledge ..• the truth is 
what is known, to be known it must be made; the 
knowing and the making of truth are inseparable. 
(Flint, p. 94) 
Vico seems to be freeing himself of the positivistic 
chains of the Newtonian science. He could now pursue 
history through what man had created, i.e. his languages, 
history, law, religion, and even mythology. (Nash,, 1969) 
In his work Scienza Nuova (New Science), Vico brought 
forth his philosophy of history. Vico was to see history 
as having been developed in three distinct stages 
(Copleston, 1985). He described these periods of history 
as the Age of Gods, Age of Heroes, and the Age of Men 
(Nash, 1969). The Age-of Gods was characterized by a 
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strong adherence to family principles. Religion played a 
major role during the Age of Gods. Man in this stage was 
fierce and cruel in nature (Nash, 1969). But the insta-
bility inherent in such a stage was to give way to the 
demands for more equality, new orders were established 
resulting in the Age-of Heroes. Nash (1969) has de-
scribed this stage as one of imagination, where men were 
able to prevail over others, resulting in an aristocratic 
stage. But this stage too would be undermined by the 
desire for equality among the masses. The Age of Heroes 
gave way to the Age of Men which was essentially 
democratic in nature (Copleston, 1985). The Age of Men 
was the Age of Reason. Rationality was to replace the 
religious aspects of men's lives. But in the process he 
was to become more benign (Nash, 1969). Table I, shown 
on the following page, demonstrates the stages Vico saw 
for man. As stated, each stage was seen as a movement 
toward a more materialistic existence. 
Vice's cyclical theory does not end with the Age of 
Men. For in the third stage there were factors which 
would contribute to its own decay. Religion in the Age 
of Men had been replaced by barren intellectualism 
(Copleston, 1985). Equality led to a decline in public 
spirit, and decadence became widespread (Copleston, 
TABLE I 
SCHEMA FOR VICO'S THREE STAGES 
Age of Gods Age of Heroes Age of Men 
Emphasis: Sensation Imagination Reason 
Nature: Cruel and Proud and Benign 
fierce noble 
Government: Theocratic Aristocratic Democracic 
1985). With the factors timing Age of Men, a new cycle 
would begin. All of this is due to the will of God, 
according to Vico (Nash, 1969). 
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CoplestQn (1985) points out that Vico's theory is not 
completely fatalistic in nature. In fact, progress can 
be made and one religion (example Christianity) may 
indeed be superior to that which it replaced. In sum, 
Vico's philosophy of history was ahead of its time, in 
that he not only developed a cyclical theory of history, 
but he had accurately anticipated the impact of the 
Newtonian scientific method on the social sciences. We 
can summarize Vicb as follows: 
1. He believed the only certain knowledge to be 
that knowledge which we ourselves have 
created. 
2. He refutes Descartes' claim of having dis-
covered one valid scientific method. 
3. He proposes that we not interpret past 
cultures through ou+ own accepted norms and 
customs. 
4. He asserts that man can only be understood 
historically. 
5. He rejects the emphasis of mathematics and 
the physical sciences in knowledge theory. 
6. He sees history as largely non-linear. 
7. He emphasizes all aspects of culture for· 
gaining a true understanding of history. 
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Vice's work was to lay the foundation for Sorokin and 
other twentieth century cyclical historians. Sorokin's 
own approach to cultural studies seems to be patterned 
after Vice's method. At the very least, Vico set forth a 
way of viewing history that was quite different from the 
prevailing historicism of the eighteenth century, a view 
that began to be noticed by Spengler and Sorokin in the 
twentieth century (Mazlish, 1966). 
Spengler's Philosophy of History 
Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) made a major contribution 
to the philosophy of history with his work The Decline of 
the West (Edwards, 1967). Spengler set forth a 
philosophy similar to Vice's cyclical theory. Cultures, 
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according to Spengler, go through seasonal changes. 
Their early heroic period is signified by its rural, 
agricultural, and feudal aspects (Edwards, 1967). Summer 
brings a movement to the cities and the development of 
the art. Autumn represents the full growth of cities and 
the arts. Similar to Vico's schema, religion is being 
replaced by the rational in the autumn period (Gardiner, 
1959). The winter is representative of the decline of 
its arts, the moral condition of its people, and a 
growing concern with mere materialism (Edwards, 1967). 
Spengler, when he published Decline of the West in 1918, 
viewed Western culture as being in its autumnal stage 
(Nash, 1969). Since World War I had been going on almost 
three years by 1918, Spengler's work seemed to have 
particular meaning to most Europeans at the time. Table 
II, shown on the following page, represents the schema by 
which Spengler represented the transitional stages man 
passes through. 
Spengler views cultures as having a typical lifespan 
of about 1,000 years (Spengler, 1918). 
Spengler defined culture as a conception involving a 
people's art, religion, and philosophy (Edwards, 1967). 
Like Vico, he feels an examination of the whole of a 
culture is important to the understanding of it. Culture 
to Spengler is an organism (Mazlish, 1966). By forming 
culture in the biological metaphor he asks us to view 
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Therefore, he sees cultures as having specific life 
cycles of birth, youth, age, and eventually death (these 
are analogous to Spengler '.s seasons) • Death is seen as 
inevitable, as with any living organism (Mazlish, 1966). 
Spengler refers to this organic view of culture as a 
morphology of world history (Spengler, 1918). He states: 
A morphology of world history, of the world-as-
history history in contrast to the morphology of 
the world-as-nature that hitherto has been almost 
the only theme of philosophy. And it reviews 
once again the forms and movements of the world 
in their depths and final significance, but this 
time according to an entirely different ordering 
which groups them not in an ensemble picture of 
everything known, but in a picture of life, and 
presents them not as things-become, but as things 
becoming. (Gardiner, 1970, p. 45) 
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As with Vico, Spengler rejects the mechanical world view. 
His organic system of culture is alive and functioning. 
Spengler concentrated his work in the classical, 
Arabic and Western cultures (Mazlish, 1966). But clearly 
it was Spengler's analysis of Western culture, and his 
predictions of its eventual downfall, that made Spengler 
interesting to so many in 1918. Like Vico, he saw West-
ern man as having become too rational, too dependent on 
the scientific spirit. The cultural revolt that Spengler 
projected was merely a part of the morphological process 
all cultures must pass through (Nash, 1969). 
Additionally, Spengler's cyclical theory of history 
was decidedly relativistic (Nash, 1969). Each culture by 
Spengler's accounting is wholly independent of one anoth-
er and as such all beliefs are relative to one another 
(Nash, 1969). Therefore, each culture should not be 
valued more than another culture. 
Relation of Vice's and Spengler's 
Theories to Sorokin 
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Both Vico and Spengler present a cyclical view of 
history. It is this cyclical view that Sorokin would 
seek to build on. As with Vico and Spengler, Sorokin's 
thesis sought an explanation of history that went beyond 
the traditional linear view. Sorokin repeatedly paid 
homage to the earlier cyclical historians for having laid 
the groundwork for his own philosophy of history 
(Sorokin, 1950). 
Spengler's view of an organic culture has also had an 
impact on Sorokin (Nash, 1969). Sorokin, too, tended to 
see cultures in the organic sense. Cultures to 
Sorokin are indeed live, functioning entities capable of 
being viewed and studied as such. While it is clear that 
Vico and Spengler's theories give us insight into 
Sorokin's concept of culture and cultural transformation, 
it is Sorokin's own exhaustive studies that make him 
worthy of study. With the possible exception of 
Sorokin's own contemporary, Arnold Toynbee, no one has 
ever offered such an exhaustive analysis of culture as 
Sorokin. In effect, he seems to have filled in many of 
the gaps left by the studies of Vico and Spengler. 
Pitirim A. Sorokin: Background and Its 
Influence on His View on Culture. 
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Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin was born in Russia in 
1889 (Cowell, 1'970). By 1906 Sorokin was caught up in 
the revolutionary forces that w~re sweeping Russia. He 
became an ~portant figure in the Socialist Revolutionary 
party and was arrested by the Czar's forces by the time 
he was eighteen (Cowell, 1970). Sorokin was a graduate 
of the University at St. Petersburg (later named Lenin-
grad) and evidently was an honor student there (Allen, 
1963). He became a lecturer at the university and was 
lecturing there when World War I began (Cowell, 1970). 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 made Sorokin weary of 
the more radical forces in Russian Society. He spoke in 
favor of moderation and was seen as a potential enemy of 
the radical Bolshevik cause (Cowell, 1970). Sorokin 
(1950) was to refer to Zinovieff, the leader in the 
Bolshevik cause as, "a disgusting creature. In his high 
womanish voice, his face, his fat figure, there is some-
thing hideous and obscene, an extraordinary moral and 
mental degenerate" (Sorokin, 1942). Needless to say, 
Sorokin did not endear himself to the Bolshevik cause. 
He found himself in a dreary prison cell by 1918 (Cowell, 
1970). After a brief period of reprieve, Sorokin was 
forced into exile (Cowell, 1970). He became even better 
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known as a writer while in Berlin and Prague, and was 
invited to lecture in the United States in 1923 (Cowell, 
1970). He would eventually become of Professor of Soci-
ology at the Universities of Minnesota and Harvard. Many 
have referred to h~ as the father of sociology in the 
United States (Allen, 1963). 
Sorokin's background in'Russia,was one of chaos.and 
even terror (his years in Soviet'prisons are described by 
Cowell (1970) as pure hell). These formative years would 
seem to be very important when attempting to view 
Sorokin's <?oncept .. of culture. Sorokin, writing of his 
life experiences states: 
Eventfulness has possibly been the most signif-
icant feature of my life adventure. In a span of 
seventy-three years I have passed through several 
cultural atmospheres: pastoral~hunter's culture 
of the Komi; first the agricultural, the~ the 
urban culture of Russi~ and Europe; and finally, 
the megalopolitan, technological culture of the 
United States. (Cowell, 1970, p. 7) 
He later writes of his "life experiences": 
Besides joys and sorrows, successes and failures 
of normal human· life, I have lived through six 
imprisonments; and I have had the unforgettable 
experience of being condemned to death and daily 
during .six weeks, expecting execution by a 
commun~st firing squad.· (Cowell; 1970, p. 7) 
As one examines Sorokin's concept of culture there is a 
feeling that his own life and his philosophy seem to 
mirror one another. 
Sorokin's Concept of Culture 
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In 1937, Sorokin published ~he first three volumes of 
Social and Cultural Dynamics (he,would ~yentuaily add a 
fourth volume). In this massive work Sorokin laid forth 
his views on culture. He was to put .forth a detailed 
analysis of culture. Cowell (1952) writes: 
He sought to analyze in more detail the nature of 
a true system of c~lture, of what he calls a 
socio-cultural system or s~persystem; to dis-
tinguish it from mere chance mixtures of an 
unsystematic, unrelated' kind that he .describes a 
socio-cultural congeries·,, as well as from 
miscellaneous collections of cultural systems. 
(p. '212) 
Sorokin viewed cultural systems as complex in nature, and 
not given to simple 'descriptions (Sorokin, 1947). 
Sorokin implies that for any culture to be understood, 
all of its various components.must be examined (Sorokin, 
1950). Its arts, language, religion, etc. must be stud-
ied. Limited atomistic approaches lead to fragmented 
results with little meaning (Sorokin, 1947). 
Sorokin sees culture existing as an entity that 
functions in a unified way. Sorokin (1950) states: 
It is ~ot identical with,th~ nation or any other 
social group. Ordinari~y'the boundaries of this 
cultural entity transcend the geographical 
>boundaries of national. or political or religious 
groups. (p. 275) 
By viewing cultures as separate entities, not bound up 
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entirely without political and geographic >forces, Sorokin 
is able to speak of Western culture in· a much less narrow 
sense than many.of his predecessors had. 
Sorokin (1947) states that each cultural system is 
based upon ~ertain premises or beliefs. He sees these 
beliefs as being the defining characteristics of a par-
ticular cultural system (Scn:;okin, 1947). These beliefs 
are those which relate .to the human. They are not 
seeking to apply them t6 pla~t, and animal life (Cowell, 
1952). Thus, anything that ~en con~ider important or of 
use has value within the context of the cultural system 
(Cowell, 1952). 
Sorokin does not view cultural systems as eternal. 
In fact, he sees them as being sub~ect to the laws of 
change, as with other living.thing~ (Sorokin, 1947). 
Here he takes on a view of an organic culture, similar to 
the views of Spengler. Furthermore, by approaching 
culture in this way he has presented a way of viewing 
culture as distinct from that of civilizations. Cowell 
(1952) states: 
••• it gives a much deeper meaning to the idea of 
civil~zation, as that word has commonly been 
used;. For the study of. successive cultural 
patterns shows up ciearly the danger of speaking 
and writing about civilizations •.. as though they 
were some easily identifiable, ·single, individual 
thing • ( p . 9 ) 
' 
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This view of culture implies that Greek civilizations or 
Roman civiliza~ion could have had several· different 
cultural systems come and go within the bounds of such a 
time period. 
Sorokiri emphasized that culture possesses a unity of 
its own (Cowell, 19~2). All the parts of the culture 
therefore contribute to its meaning. As Cowell (1952) 
states: 
A true culture must possess a unity of its own 
' ' 
from which·the meaning of all its various parts 
or components is derived and to which they all 
contribute.· Far from economics being able to 
explain the whole of culture therefore, it is the 
form and nature of the dominant culture that 
determines the economic pattern·of life within 
the culture~ (p. 10) 
By insisting that cultu~e be viewed as a unified 
meaningful whole, Sorokin is rejecting the linear con-
cepts dominant in the social sciences. By viewing cul-
tures from a holistic perspective, he sets the stage by 
which cultures can be viewed ~s subject to change, even 
destruction. Individuals count ,in his cultural scheme, 
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but it is the whole of ~he cultural mesh that determines 
its direction. 
Sorokin's view of culture asks us to,see society in 
all of its complexities. Love, principles, ethics, art; 
in short, all of the complexities of life are to be 
examined. After having established his concept of cul-
ture, Sorokin turned to the question of how and why 
cultures change. 
Sorokin's Concept,of Cultural 
Transfprmation 
In his massive work, Social and Cultural Dynamics 
(1937), Sorokin discussed how cultures change and why 
' 
they change (Cowell, 1952). Despite the complex view'of 
culture laid forth by Sorokin, he does believe,that it is 
possible to detect order and patterns in these cultures 
(Sorokin, 1950). Sorokin's views countered those who 
found no cultural uniformities (Cowell, 1952). To 
Sorokin there is much to begained by tracing the 
patterns of cultural development. 
Since Sorokin established that cultures tend to exist 
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as wholes, but with subsystems operating within the 
dominant (supersystem), he was faced with answering the 
question of whether cultures change as a whole or atomis-
tically (Cowell, 1952). Sorokin answers this by refer-
ring to closely integrated and nonclosely integrated 
systems. By integrated, Sorokin is referring to a cul-
tural system that is very coherent (unified) in its 
ideological beliefs ( Sorokin, 194 7). He describe's such 
an integrated system as follows: . 
When in any given universe of ideological systems 
we find the vastest combined system of ideology, 
that integrates into one consistent unity most of 
the essential scientific (including the economic, 
political, social, and humanistic sciences), 
philosophical, religious, aesthetic, juridical, 
ethical, and technological systems; in which all 
these articulate the same basic meanings, values, 
and norms, we have the vastest ideological super-
system possible in a given universe of ideologi-
cal systems. The articulated basic ideas and 
values make up its major premise. (Sorokin, 
1947, p. 319) 
Such a closely integrated system changes as a whole, 
according to Sorokin (Cowell, 1952). The greater the 
integration and inter-dependence of the system, the 
greater the chances are of a cultural transformation 
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taking place as a "togetherness" (Cowell, 195~). Con-
versely, a non-closely integrated system will see only 
those aspects of the culture which are most important , 
change together (Cowell, 1952). It is important to note 
that even in a han-integrated system, ch~nge does still 
occur. The, non-integrated aspects of the culture simply 
change at a slower rate (Sorokin, 1947). 
To explain why cultures change, Sorokin presented a 
concept known as the Principle of Immanent Change. This 
principle explains that the dominant cultural system 
practices activities generally designed to foster the 
ongoing existence of that particular culture. Eventually 
the system begins to wear itself out. As Cowell (1970) 
states: 
The continued'practice of activities directed to 
any one end, noble as it may be, is more than 
humanity has been able to stand. Some values 
once honored begin to lose their appeal; 
responses become stereotyped and unreal. Almost 
all human experience testifies to such a 
development. (p. 47) ~ 
Thus to Sorokin, change need not be immediate. It can be 
very gradual, but it is built into any cultural system. 
Sorokin also sought to discover whether cultural 
changes take place in a rhythm or cyclical fashion 
(Cowell, 1952). Sorokin made use of several theories 
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relating to rhythm. He identified the Chinese concept of 
Yin and Yang and certain Hindu concepts of rhythm 
(Cowell, 1952). He also points out that such thinkers as 
Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Vico,_Descartes, etc. estab,;. 
lished the rea_lity of rhytbmi'<:::al change (Cowell, 1952) . 
Sorokin's intense studies led him to conclude that rhyth-
matic change takes 'place in.a three-phase rhythm. That 
he describes as the rhythm of Ideational, Idealistic, and 
Sensate cultures. He applied that rhythmatic scheme to 
Western culture and did not seek to apply it to all other 
cultural schemes. 
Sorokin's Ideational, Sensate, and 
Idealistic Cultures 
Sorokin identified three broad systems of Western 
culture, which he saw as being subject to rhythmatic 
change (Sorokin, 1947) .. He· q~scribed these systems as 
the Ideational, Sensate, and Idealistic. He sought to 
describe these systems in terms of their relation to all 
aspects of culture. ·He examined the art, philosophy;, 
religion, music, etc. of Western culture. But this 
examination is best clarified through what Sorokin clas-
sifies as systems of truth. In other words, all aspects 
of culture can be.examined through the Ideational, Sen-
sate, and Idealistic systems of truth. 
Sorokin described Ideational truth as the truth of 
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faith (Sorokin, 1947). He describes such a trust system 
as follows: 
Ideational truth is indeed the truth revealed by 
the grace of God through his mouthpieces (the 
prophets, mystics, oracles, and founders of 
religion), disclosed in a supersensory way 
through myst~c experience, direct revelation, 
divine intuition, and inspiration. (p. 607) 
Sorokin's Ideational truth system thus rejects the empir-
ical basis for establishing truth. Sorokin (1947) 
states: 
Since according to the major.premise, sensory 
reality and values are not the true reality and 
values, the Ideational system of truth is little 
interested in the study of the physical, 
chemical, and biological properties of the 
empirical world. (p. 607) 
_consequently, a society basing its philosophy, arts, etc. 
upon such a system of truth, is not concerned with scien-
tific discoveries (technological inventions). Instead, 
the Ideational system of truth turns for inspiration to 
the non-material world. Sorokin refers to this as the 
supersensory world (Sorokin, 1941). 
An Ideational system does come to terms with the 
sensory world. It does not reject its existence. The 
wealth and pleasures of the sensory world were, however, 
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to be viewed with indifference (Sorokin, 1941). Sorokin 
explains: 
The sensory world was considered a mere temporary 
"city of man" in which a Christian was but a 
pilgrim aspiring to reach the eternal City of God 
and seeking to render himself worthy to enter it. 
In brief, the integrated part of this culture was 
not a conglomeration of various cultural objects, 
phenomena, and values, but a unified system--a 
whole whose parts articulate the same principle 
of true reality and value: an infinite, super-
sensory, and super-rational God, omnipresent, 
omnipotent, omniscient, absolutely just, good, 
and beautiful, creator of the world and man. (p. 
19) 
Sorokin has painted a picture of the members of an Ide-
ational culture as contemplators. There are men and 
women who rely on spiritual strength for guidance. The 
Ideational system rejects that which is only temporary 
(i.e. material possessions), and aspires to eternal 
truths and values (Allen, 1963). Sorokin describes the 
supreme goal as the union with the absolute (Allen, 
1963). 
Historical periods associated with the Ideational 
mentality can be directly associated with highly reli-
gious societies. Conversely, one would see no growth, or 
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even a decline in scientific advances with such a system 
(Allen, 1963). Sorokin was able to associate the 
Ideational mentally not only with Western culture, but 
with aspects of the Brahmanic culture of India, the 
Buddhist and Taoist cultures (of India and China), and 
even in Greek culture (for the Greeks he sees evidence of 
an ideational mentality between the eighth and sixth 
centuries B.C. (Sorokin, 1941). According to Sorokin, 
the ideational mentality of Western man began to decline 
during the medieval period. 
Sorokin dates the decline of the Ideational system in 
medieval culture near the end of the twelfth century 
(Sorokin, 1941). After which, there emerged a new system 
which he described as the Idealistic system of truth. An 
Idealistic system of truth can be described as being 
logically and organically integrated (Allen, 1963). It 
is a mixed cultural system integrating aspects of the 
Ideational system with that of the sensory world. 
Sorokin (1947) describes the Idealistic system as fol-
lows: 
As a synthesis of sensory, rational, and super-
sensory truth the Idealistic system of truth 
recognizes the role of the sense organs and of 
reason as the source and criterion of the 
validity or invalidity of a proposition concern-
ing sensory and rational phenomena. In regards 
to supersensory phenomena it claims that any 
knowledge of these is impossi~le through sensory 
experience and is. obtained only through the 
direct revelation- of God. H~an reason combines 
into one organic whole the t~uth of' senses, the 
truth of· ~aith, and the truth of reason. (p. 610) 
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Sorokin's Idealistic culture is one of harmony and whole-
ness. The Idealistic culture seeks its values in both ' , . 
the spiritual and materialistic worlds (Cowell, 1952). 
It brings to us a picture of people using the material 
world (sensory)· to help humanity seek its fullest poten-
tial with science and spirituality working hand in hand. 
A holistic picture is seen, in which the two cannot be 
separated; they are .aspects of the same thing. 
By describing this Idealistic culture or Integral 
culture as he sometimes calls it, as a blend of past and 
present cultural values, Sorokin is rejecting the strict 
linear, view of culture. Strict empiricism is dealt a 
blow by such a cultural system. Sorokin (1937) states: 
Its ultimate principle proclaims that the true 
reality.-value is an Infinite .Manifold which has 
supersensory, rational, and sensor¥ forms 
inseparable from one another ..• it includes the 
empirical as well as th~ super empirical aspects 
of reality, science as well as philosophy and 
theology. (Oliver, 1989, p. 28) 
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The Integral system described by Sorokin is not closed to 
one dominant category of knowing. Truth is defined 
through a variety of mediums. Philosophy takes its place 
as a source of truth, existi~g simulta~eously wit~ scien-
tific progress. -Religion is still very m~ch a part of 
the cultural scheme~ The Sensate world-exists to promote 
' 
the human spirit in the best ~ays'possible (Cowell, 
1952). In ~hart, the purpose of an Idealistic culture is 
' - ' 
to promote spi·z.:i tual developme~t, not hinder it. 
The Idealistlc blend would seem -·to -be the logical 
outcome of cult;ural progression, t;he stopping point of 
cultural progression. But Sorok~n tells us that this is 
not the cas_e. He identifies the cultures of the' 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Europe as 
predominately Ideali~tic (Sorokin, 1941). He contends 
that between the fifteenth ~nd seventeenth centuries a 
new culture began to develop in the Western world to 
replace the Idealistic cultu~al scheme (Sorokin, 1941). 
He states: 
The IdeatiQnal culture of the-Middle Ages con-. 
tinued to decline, whereas the culture based upon 
the premise that true reality and value are 
' 
sensory continued to gather momentum during the 
subsequent centuries. Beginning roughly with the 
sixteenth century the new principle became 
dominant; and with it the new form of culture 
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that was based upon it. (p. 20) 
This Sensate' culture, according_to Sorokin is domi-
nated by senso~. perception (Sorokin, 1947). Sensate 
,, ' 
truth is determined by the sense organs'(Sorokin, 1947; 
' ' ' ' 
p. 610). '•sorokiri '(1947) st~tes': -
In this ·system of truth the sense organs become 
' - . 
the pri~cipal sourc'e of. cognition of sensory 
reality~ their ~estimony.decides what is t~ue and 
what is false; they become the supreme arbiters 
'· 
of the validity of any experience and proposi-
tion. Another name for this truth of the senses 
is empiricism.. (p. 610) · 
Empiricism (Sensate truth) can the~ be directly linked to 
the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth century. 
Sorokin finds th~ philospphy of John Locke to be the 
" I ' 
personification of such a·s~nsate system (Sorokin, 1947). 
For Locke's statement th~t there is, "not})ing_ in the mind 
that was not already in the Sense," is to Sorokin the 
exact formula needed for the development of a Sensate 
culture (Soiokin, 1~4J). 
Sorokin identifies other aspects of the Sensate 
system of truth. In fact, his descriptions of the sen-
/ 
sate system often a~e more defined than those he gives to 
the Ideational and Idealistic cultures. Perhaps these 
descriptions are fuller due to the fact that he has· 
ide~tified modern Western culture with the Sensate cul-
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tural system (Allen, 1963). Sorokin (1947) includes the 
following descriptions.in his discussion of the Sensate 
system: 
1. Any system of Sensat.~ truth and reality 
implies a denial of; O~·ari utterly 
. -
indifferent att:itude toward, any supe,r-
' ' 
sensory reality or value.. ( Sorokin, 
1947, p. 610). 
The Sensate system of truth denies the ability to know 
that which is purely metaphysical. Th~ metaphysical is 
either denied in total or relegate~ to the unknowable. 
Sorokin (1947) identifies Kant's criticism, agnosticism, 
and positivism as examples of Sensate truth at work. 
2. If the Sensate system disfavors any 
preoccupation with the supersensory 
aspects of reality, it most strongly 
favors the study of the sensorY world, 
with its physica~, chemical and biologi-
' ' 
cal properties and rela~ionships. 
(So+okin, i947, pp! 610~611) 
Here Sorokin tells us that in a Sensate system of truth 
science becomes the. measure of what i~ true •. To study 
the sciences is 'to become knowledgeable. The study of 
theology is replaced by the"' study of natural science 
(Sorokin, 1947). Sorokin cites the prolification of 
scientific discoveries in the eighteenth-twentieth centu-
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ries as evidence of the preoccupation with natural sci-
ence (Sorokin, 1947). All cultures which are associated 
with a Sensate system of culture see an increase in 
scientific discoveries. As evidence Sorokin cites 
aspects of a Sensate culture in certain ancient cultures 
(Sorokin, 1947). 
3. Sensate truth, or empiricism, as we have 
seen, rejects any revealed super-sensory 
truth. It discredits also, to a certain 
extent, reason and logic as the sources 
of truth until their deductions are 
corroborated by the testimony of the 
sense organs ... Therefore in Sensate 
cultures and societies the empirical 
systems of philosophy based upon 
Ideational or Idealistic truths decline. 
(Sorokin, 1947, p. 611) 
Sorokin is no doubt ref~rring here to the growth of 
skeptical philosophy as promoted by Locke (1690) and 
later by such men as David Hurne (1711) and Bertrand 
Russell (1949). He sees the movement of Ideational and 
Idealistic art and philosophy moving in the opposite 
direct of the prevailing Sensate system (Sorokin, 1949). 
Sorokin, writing in 1947, saw the Sensate system of truth 
having greatly proliferated in the first half of the 
twentieth century (Sorokin, 1947). 
4. A fully developed Sensate system of truth 
and cognition is inevitably "material-
istic", viewing everythi:Q.g, openly or 
covertly, in its materialistic aspects . 
... Hence the general tendency of the 
sensate mentality to regard the world--
even man, his culture and consciousness 
itself--materialistically, mechanis~ic­
ally, behavioristically. (Sorokin, 1947, 
p. 611) 
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Sorokin contends that the scientific world has created a 
culture oriented almost entirely to the materialistic 
world. Man, he states, "by scientific definition becomes 
a complex of electrons and protons" (p. 613). Sorokin 
believes that the medieval period between 500 and 1300 
was almost entirely devoid of materialistic concerns, 
' -
while the periods following 1300 show a measured increase 
in materialistic concerns (Sorokin, 1947). Correspond-
ingly, idealism declined in direct proportion to materi-
alism, according to Sorokin's studies. 
5. A further consequence of such a system of 
truth is the development of a temporal-
istic, relativistic, and nihilistic 
mentality. The sensate world is in a 
state of incessant flux and becoming. 
There is nothing unchangeable in it, not 
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even an eternal Supreme Being. (Sorokin, 
1947, p. 610) · 
Sorokin cites the tendency of ~~nsate cultures to live in 
the pres~nt_. The,past'has little meaning. Progress 
' ' -
(linear development) is ~he focus. Sorokin quotes the 
latin phrase Carpe Diem, "seize the d~y", as )?eing sym-
bolic of the Se,nsate' culture (S.orokin, 1947). ·Getting· 
rich quick and.opportunity for one's self take precedence 
over meditative plans. The future is too uncertain to 
contemplate. Thus, the present is real 'and worth dealing 
with (Sorokin, 1947). 
6. From the same system of truth and values 
follows the doctrine of relativism. 
Since everything is temporal and subject 
' ' 
to incessant change, and since sensory 
perception differs· ·in the case of 
different orgaJ?.isms ,· individuals, and 
groups, nothing absolute e~ists. 
Everything becomes rei~tive--truth and 
error, moral and aesthetic considera-
tions, and what not. (Sorokin, 1947, p. 
614) 
Sorokin states that relativism grows in d1rect proportion 
to sensate development. Eventually the relativistic 
outlook becomes so uncompromising that everything can. be 
considered relativized (Sorokin, 1947). But Sorokin adds 
that relativism eventually gives way to complete scep-
ticism, cynicism, and nihil~sm (Sorokin, 1941). 
Eventually, according to Sorokin, society under such a 
relativistic scheme, will either perish or turn to 
another system of truth (Sorokin, 1947). (Since truth 
has essentially been replaced by complete relativism.) 
7. All this means that sensory truth, when 
made excl~sive, inevitably develops into 
a kind of illusionism ..• Decadent sensory 
science even declares that is,not con-
cerned with any true"reality. In this 
way,sensory truth eventually digs its own 
grave. (Sorokin, 1947, p. 614) 
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Sorokin appears to be speaking to philosophical concerns 
when he speaks of Sensate illusionism.· Sens~te culture 
is unable to focus on real human concerns. Sorokin 
believes that in place of human. concerns artificial 
constructs (i.e. scientific principles) become the norm 
(Sorokin, 1947). Thus humanity (human conce~ns) is not 
really knowable. 
8. The same system of truth gives rise to 
the nominalistic and singularistic 
mentalities characteristic of sensate 
society. Sensory perceptions are always 
singularistic ... Such a mentality regards 
society as simply a sum of interacting 
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individuals. It cannot see the forest 
for the trees. (Soroki~, 1947, p. 614) 
Sorokin's view of Sensate culture is that of a culture 
' ' ' 
which does 'not·'maintain a holistic perspective. Sensate 
culture is'--atomistic in its approach· (corresponding to 
Newtonian logic). Universalism is decided ln Sensate 
culture as,- "the p~oduct of unscientif·ic minds" (Sorokin, 
1947). Such a culture emphasized individuar concerns 
more than socie~y as a whole. 
' ' 
9. Finally, sensate'science, philosophy, 
pseudo-religion, and ethics are util-
-
itarian, hedonistic, pragmatic, oper-
ational, and in,strumental. Science and 
philosophy come to'be imbued with 
utilitarian aims. Only those disciplines 
\ 
which, like physics, and chemistry, 
biology and medic'lne, geology, _ and 
geography, technology, politics and 
economics, are emi~ently p~actical and 
serviceable are intensively cultivated. 
(Sorokin, 1947, P-· 614) 
Sorokin tells us that metaphysical philosophy has no 
place in the Sensat,e culture. ,In fact, metaphysics tends 
to be ignored entirely within a Sensate culture (S~rokin, 
1947). Control, utilitarian control, becomes the prime 
motivator within the Sensate culture. Sorokin spec~fi-
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cally uses. the schools as an example of how the sansate 
system of though~ deve~ops. Our schools. have become 
preoccupied with "useful _knowledge", according to Sorokin 
(Sorokin, 1947). Real knowledge, wisdom as ~ascribed by 
- ' Sorokin, is secondary to utilitarian conc~rns .(Sorokin, 
1947, p. 61!? )-· -
Sorokin's detailed descriptions of t~e Sensate 
culture reveal his contenti~p that culture is in transi-
tion (Oliver, 1989). Sorokin contends that to understand 
cultural transformation the three'main forms of culture 
must not be viewed in isolation from one another (Oliver,, 
1989). Sorokin believes it is essential to be able to 
contast these cultural systems (Sorokin, 1947). 
Contrast of the Ideational 
and-Sensate Cultu~e 
As stated ~ave, Sorokin believes that it·is ex-
tremely important to be able to contrast the-differences 
between the three cultural supersystems.. Especially 
between the ideational and sensate cultures (Sorokin, 
194 7) • He bel'ieves this contrasting helps to explain. the 
development (and eventual dominance) of one cultural 
system over another. He states: 
What appears true from the standpoint of Ide-
ational truth is ignorance and superstition from 
the standpoint of Sensate truth,_and vice versa. 
Many a revealed truth of religion is utterly 
false from the point of view of an exclusive 
truth of the senses, and vice yersa. (Sorokin, 
1947, p. 615) 
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Sorokin's expl~nations of philosophy tend to support 
the notion of the exclusion of one syste~'s truths over 
another. The e~forts of the Logical Positivists in the 
twentieth century to reduce all philosophy to mathemati-
cal (Sensate) concepts would, seem ,to be an example of 
this exclusion process at work. 
Sorokin cites the decline of religion as an example 
of the contrast of the Ideational and Sensate cultural 
systems. He believes that sensory truth, as it has 
developed, tends to.view the_Christian concepts of truth, 
faith, and revelation as mere superstition (Sorokin, 
1947). However, the Christ-ian faith would view mere 
sense perception as ephemeral and not worthy of our time 
or effort. 
The contrasting of the systems of truth also serves 
to support Sorokin's contention that cultural systems are 
not linear. By showing the contrasts that have developed 
over the centuries, Sorokin believes that oscillation, 
rather than linearity, is the way of cultural systems 
(Sorokin, 1941). Sorokin sought to contrast the 
development of the systems of truth through exhaustive 
quantitative methods. His extensive use of charts, 
graphs, and comparative studies, tended to lend 
credibility to his cultural theories, (Allen, 1963). 
Sorokin's Methods of Research 
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Sorokin's methoda of research included an exhaustive 
look into the nature and development of ethical systems 
(Cowell, 1970). To do so Sorokin surveyed the philoso-
phies of hundreds of historical figures to formulate his 
thesis. To demonstrate the philosophical division 
between determinism and indeterminism Sorokin created 
tables reflecting the shifts in these viewpoints between 
540 B.C. and A.D. 1920. Sorokin, in these instances used 
rating scales from one to twelve'to demonstrate the 
degree to which a deterministic or indeterminate view was 
associated with a particular individual. Sorokin was 
aware that some writers/philosophers were not easily 
placed in a particular category. In these instances 
Sorokin simply does not include them in his tables 
(Cowell, 1970). Tables III and IV (on following pages) 
demonstrate how Sorokin sought to measure the 
eras of history which reflect a drop or change to 
determinism or indeterminism. Note: The larger numbers 
represent those who would rate higher on the scale. For 
instance, Plato with a 12 rating would be said to have 
viewpoints which are highly deterministic and Wycliff 
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with a 3 would be said to be less deterministic in his 
outlook. 
TABLE III 
SOROKIN'S SURVEY OF DETERMINIST AUTHORS 
Author Author Author 
Pythagoras 8 Heraclitus 7 Panaetius 5 
Plato 12 Zeno 8 Varro 5 
Cicero 8 N. Figulus 4 Epictetus 6 
Plutarch 8 M. Aurelius 6 Luther 8 
Wycliffe 3 L. da Vinci 8 Calvin 6 
Zwingli 6 Melanchthon 5 Kepler 8 
G. Bruno 8 Bacon 7 Hobbes 8 
Galileo 8 Jansen 6 Pascal 7 
Guelinex 6 Spinoza 8 Malebranche 7 
Mandeville 4 Hume 8 Voltaire 7 
Helvetius 6 Holback 6 Priestley 6 
Diderot 7 Kant 12 Bentham 6 
J. Mill 6 A. Comte 8 Spencer 8 
K. Marx 8 Engels 6 Tolstoy 8 
Bradley 7 Democritus 8 
Table III represents Sorokin's survey of philosophers 
and writers whom he determined to be deterministic in 
their philosophy. 
Table IV demonstrates Sorokin's list of writers and 
philosophers from 580 B.C. to 1920 whom he determined to 
have an indeterminate bent. 
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Sorokin was careful to point out that some writers 
have intentionally presented both deterministic and 
indeterminate views (Cowell, 1970). Kant is an example 
of a writer who espoused the two views. In particular, 
TABLE IV 
SOROKIN'S SURVEY OF INDETERMINIST AUTHORS 
Author Author Author 
Aristotle 12 Grosseteste 4 Glisson 3 
Theophrastus 7 A. Magnus 8 Berkeley 8 
Epicurus 8 St. Thomas 12 Kant 12 
Lucretius 8 Aquinas Vi co 7 
P. Judaeus 8 R. Lully 5 J. Edwards 6 
J. Martyr 5 M. Eckhart 8 Rousseau 8 
Apuleius 6 Dante 8 Condillac 6 
Origen 8 Gerson 4 Fichte 8 
Tertullian 6 Nicolas of 8 Schiller 8 
Plotinus 12 Crus a Herder 6 
Porphyry 7 Erasmus 5 Goethe 8 
St. Basil 6 Loyola 8 Whewell 6 
St.Augustine 10 Cardan 6 Schelling 8 
Gregory I. 4 Campanella 6 Carlyle 4 
M. Confessor 6 Gassendi 7 Lotze 5 
Alcuin 4 Descartes 8 Hartmann 8 
St. Anselm 7 Cudworth 5 Dostoevsky 7 
St. Bernard 5 Leibniz 9 J.S. Mill 8 
Abelard 4 Malebranche 7 Rickert 6 
P. Lombard 4 R. Boyle 4 w. James 4 
John of 3 Locke 8 L. Stephen 7 
Salisbury H. More 4 
Bossuet 6 
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Kant's In Critique of Pure Reason, is a classic example 
of the dualism that Sorokin points to. In both the 
determinism and indeterminism lists Kant receives the 
' 
highest-~ating of 12. 
Table·V represents the result of Sorokin's combining 
the tables .of determinism and indeterminism to show the 
incidents of each in various time periods. 
TABLE V' 
SOROKIN'S HISTORICAL PERIODS OF 
DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM 
Period Determinism Indeterminism 













Sorokin's attempts to analyze the literature of such 
a broad expanse of time represent a monumental task. 
However, by demonstrating how eaqh time period produced 
writers of the deterministic and indeterministic modes, 
he gives us a way of visualizing his thesis of cultural 
flow. Interestingly, the period between 1500 and 1920 
shows the forces of determinism and indeterminism having 
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reached a near balance. Sorokin (1950) indicates that 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century have accounted for a shift from 
determinism to a more indeterminate view. 
Figure 1, shown below, represents Sorokin's attempt 













580 400 200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 
Figure 1. Sorokin's Chart of Deterministic and 
Indeterministic Philosophies, 580 B.C. 
to 1900 A.D. 
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Sorokin's chart indicates that a mix of d~terministic 
and indeterminate philosophies become more pronounced by 
the beginning of the 1900's. The fluctuations between 
1200 and 1900 are interesting to note. 
Sorokin (1941) attempted to survey all major 
historical persons from the period 950 B.C. to 1849. His 
research was drawn from The Encyclopedia Brittanica 
published in 1875. 
A careful survey of Tables VI and VII (shown on the 
following pages), indicate that in each time period the 
Ideational, Mixed, and Sensate cultures coexist (Cowell, 
1952). Cowell (1952) states the following regarding the 
Brittanica tables: 
This empirical study was made independently 
unaware of the main conclusions to which 
Sorokin's other work was pointing. It provides 
historical evidence that there is an 
association between the type of dominant 
culture and the frequency of the .type of 
conduct and personality. (p. 211) 
Smith (1963) also agrees with Cowell's assessment of the 
validity of Sorokin's historical studies. Certainly, 
Soroki.n cannot be faulted by being too superficial. The 






















GEOMETRIC AVERAGES FOR TYPES OF 
HISTORICAL PERSONS 
950 TO 1 B.C. 
Ideational Mixed Sensate 
~umber Percent ~umber Percent Number Percent 
0 0 0 0 17.9 100 
13.7 12 0 0 102.7 88 
0 0 18.0 100 0 0 
21.6 53 0 0 19.2 47 
53.4 76 11.8 17 5.2 7 
9.8 34 11.1 38 7.9 28 
21.5 22 35.6 37 38.6 41 
69.6 38 61.0 34 50.7 28 
120.4 40 67.5 22 114.2 38 
124.6 37 107.6 33 100.9 30 
68.6 11 228.9 38 306.2 51 
79.6 13 326.0 56 180.7 31 
43.2 7; 279.9 45 290.1 48 
33.1 12 192.1 70 59.7 18 
12.6 5 85.3 35 148.1 60 
12.5 5 96.3 39 145.1 56 
0 0 43.6 45 51.8 55 
16.9 4 112.4 24 333.8 72 









































GEOMETRIC AVERAGES-FOR TYPES OF 
HISTORICAL PERSONS 
1 TO 1849 A.D. 
Ideational Mixed . Sensate 
Number Percent ~umber Percent ~UI11l?er Percent 
179.9 31 119.3 21 272.9 48 
46.0 9 219.2 43 240.7 48 
100.0 26 2Q8.4 55 72.0 
'• 
19 
23.7 7 238.4 76 54.7 17 
121.5 43 133.5 47 29'. 8 10 
102.7 56 32.8 18 46.9 26 
78.0 23 126.2 37 139.0 40 
204.7 40 190.2 39 111~7 32 
80.4 22 165.2 45 123.7 33 
22.8 11 113.4 52 8o·. 4 37 
77.9 28 84.6 30 115.9 42 
45.6- 30 58.6 39 48.0 31 
58.5 40 45.2 31 42.2 29 
29.6 45 19.0 29 17.2 26 
43.1 44 15.3 16 38.7 40 
33.8 48' 12.6 18 23.6 34 
57.0 36 74.1 47 26.3 17 
91.0 37 76.6 31 76.8 32 
16.8' 14 51.7 42 54.5 44 
18.1 10 75.6 42 87.2 48 
38.2 15 75.0 29 148.5 56 
24.4 6 145.6 37 218.7 57 
72.5 17 176.6 41 177.3 42 
74.8 15 210.9 41 228.0 44 
66.1 15 166.9 36 231.3 49 
172.0 33 185.9 35 167.0 32 
-91.4 26 181.7 51 81.2 23 
144.6 23 152.5 24 330.4 53 
141.4 18 322.7 42 302.1 40 
240.9 15 602.1 38 730.9 47 
543.4 17 1037.5 33' 1543.1 50 
485.9 14 l429.7 41 1528.1 45 
537.0 12 1861.5' 42 2023.5 46 
_949. 4 19 1641.8 34 2179.0 47 
724.0 17 2014.4 44 1534.0 39 
901.6 10 3566.6 41 4329.9 49 
1460.0 9 7301.1 50 5870.5 41 
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Regarding the historical work centering on the 
Brittannica study, Cowell (1952) makes the following 
conclusions shown in Table VIII below: 
"TABLE VIII 







A.D. 1 - 249 
A.D. 250 - 899 
A.D. 900 - 1399 
Conclusions 
represents a transitional period 
shows a notable increase in the 
percentage of ideational types 
is in a near balance 
shows extensive change with 
ideational culture in decline 
indicates transition to the 
ideational 
ideational types prevail 
ideational types are in decline 
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Based on his study of historical characters, cultures 
have been in a state of change and do tend to move.in 
periods of from two to four hundred years. Combining 
Sorokin's tables regarding determinism and indeterminism 
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with the Brittannica study we are able to trace these 
developments. Based on these studies, Sorokin (1950) 
indicated that the last half- of the. twentieth century 
would see a .definite rise in the. Lnfluence of Ideational 
types. Sorokin (1950~ 'was .then abie to forecast a 
decline in the dominant Sensate culture, which he 
believed had dominated the Western world since the Age of 
Enlightenment •. 
Sorokin (1947) also sought to demonstrate the 
fluctuations in patterns of happiness and ethics. His 
ethics of happiness, which Sorokin describes as wealth, 
pleasure, and utility, are associated with sensory 
perceptions, and thus associated with a Sensate culture. 
His absolute ethics, which Sorokin identifie-s with 
religious principles, is associ~ted with Ideational 
cultures (Sorokin, 1947). · T~le IX,_shown on the 
following page, de~onstrates Sorokin's plotting of the 
trends of Sensate ethics of _happiness and Absolute-· 
Ideational ethics from 400 A.D. to 1920. 
- ·Sorokin demonstrates that the Sensate system of · 
ethics has never completely dominated. Coversely, the 
absolute Ideational ethics system-maintained a dominant 
position throughout most of the time period from 400 A.D. 
to 1920. The period 1900-1920 indicates the most balance 
TABLE IX 
FLUCTUATIONS OF SENSATE AND 
IDEATIONAL ETHICS 
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in the two ethical systems. Sorokin (1947) sees this 
shift towards Sensate ethics as indicative of the trend 
in modern history away from the commitment to religious 
principles and towards materialism. He states: 
Early and medieval Christianity had denounced 
wealth as the source of perdition; money making, 
as summae periculosae; profit, as a turpe lucrum; 
money lending, as a grave crime; the rich man, as 
the first candidate for perdition .. '· it was more 
difficult for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of 
God than for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle. Now the Reformation and the Renaissance 
made an about face. On Sundays he [the Puritan] 
believes in God and Eternity; on weekdays in the 
stock exchange. (p. 622) 
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Sorokin believed that the growth of paganism, 
capitalism, utilitarianism, crime, and even Protestanism 
accompanied the growth of Sensate ethics (Sorokin, 1947). 
His research indicates that Sensate ethics have played a 
dominant role in society since the sixteenth century. 
Allen (1963) and Cowell (1970), have praised the 
thoroughness of Sorokin's research. Sorokin's numerous 
categories of research have perhaps contributed to his 
acceptance among other sociologists/historians. 
Sorokin's General Thesis 
Sorokin's research led him to believe that the 
Sensate system of ethics had reached its peak in the mid-
nineteenth century. He also believes that the dominant 
Sensate culture is in a state of decline. Sorokin (1941) 
states: 
Every important aspect of the life, organi-
zation, and the culture of Western society is in 
the extraordinary crisis ... Its body and mind are 
sick and there is hardly a spot on its body which 
is not sore, nor any nervous fiber which func-
tions soundly ••• we are seemingly between two 
epochs: the dying Sensate culture of our 
magnificent yesterday and the coming Ideational 
culture of the creative tomorrow. We are living, 
thinking, and acting at the end of a brillant 
six-hundred-year-long Sensate day. The oblique 
rays of the sun still illuminate the glory of the 
passing epoch. But the light is fading, and in 
the deepening shadows it becomes more and more 
difficult to see clearly and to orient ourselves 
safely in the confusions of the twilight. The 
night of the transitory period begins to loom 
before us, with its nightmares, frightening 
shadows, and heartrending horrors. Beyond it, 
however, the dawn of a new great Ideational 
culture is probably waiting to greet the men of 
the future. (p. 13) 
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Sorokin's thesis is then both pessimistic and optimistic. 
Transition is inevitable and we are to experience some 
upheaval as the Sensate culture fades away. Sorokin 
(1942) states: 
Wars and revolutions are not to disappear in the 
twentieth century but will grow in the twentieth 
century to an absolutely unprecedented height, 
looming more imminent and more formidable than 
ever before; that democracies were declining, 
giving place to various kinds of despotisms; that 
the creative forces of Western culture were 
withering and drying up. (pp. 13-14) 
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This upheaval has certainly come to pass. Johnson (1983) 
estimates that over one-hundred-twenty million people 
have perished as a direct result of the wars of the 
twentieth century. Sorokin's thesis, to our horror, has 
become a reality. But is is important to consider the 
optimistic aspects of his general thesis. The Sensate 
culture is to give way to an Ideational culture that will 
hold new promise for the human race. These opportunities 
will not mean the swapping of one ideology for another; 
but something far more profound. The new culture will 
represent a change in mankind's fundamental attitudes 
(Sorokin, 1942). 
Since the transition is inevitable, Sorokin implies 
that the establishment will fight to retain their 
position (Sorokin, 1942). He states: 
It is a crisis in their art and science, 
philosophy and religion, law and morals, manners 
and mores; in the forms of social, political, and 
economic organization, including the nature of 
the family and marriage--in brief, it is a crisis 
involving almost the whole way of life, thought, 
and conduct of Western society. More precisely, 
it consists in a disintegration of a fundamental 
form of Western culture and society dominant for 
the last four centuries. (p. 17) 
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The resistance of certain elements of society to the 
transition from a Sensate culture becomes one of the 
dominant themes in Sorokin's thesis. Sorokin sees this 
as quite natural. These elements find their very way in 
life at stake (Sorokin, 1947). Current cries for the 
continuation of Western traditions in unadulterated forms 
could be construed to be signs of the fight to save a 
dying Sensate culture. 
Sorokin (1942) predicted a rise in crime, divorce 
rates, robbery and a myriad of other calamaties as the 
transition takes place. Capra (1982), Ferguson (1980), 
Glieck (1987) all have projected that current upheavals 
in society are representative of a culture in the midst 
of dramatic change. Their contentions tend to lend 
support to Sorokin's general thesis. 
Implications of Sorokin's Theory 
Sorokin's work coincides with that of Vico and 
f Spengler. Both Vico and Spengler predicted that Western 
culture was in a state of flux. Change, according to 
Vico and Spengler is inevitable. Spengler's prediction 
of decline and failure in the West was particularly 
disturbing since his projections coincided with the 
catastrophic events of World War I. Sorokin's analysis 
also seems timely given the widespread despair 
experienced by so many in the twentieth century, a 
century some have described as the dark century. 
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Several contemporary authors have suggested that our 
Western culture,is in decline. Capra (1982) in his work 
The Turning Point projects profound changes in Western 
society. He sees these changes as eminent. Like 
Sorokin, Capra feels the time has past for Western 
culture as we know it (Capra, 1982). He states: 
Cultural transformations of this magnitude and 
depth cannot be prevented. They should not be 
opposed but, on the contrary, should be welcomed 
as the only escape from agony, collapse, or 
mummification. What we need, to prepare 
ourselves for the great transition we are about 
to enter, is a deep reexamination of the main 
premises and values of our culture, a rejection 
of those conceptual models that have outlived 
their usefulness, and a new recognition of some 
of the values discarded in previous periods of 
our cultural history. (p. 33) 
Capra's call for a reexamination of the premise on which 
our current cultural system is built would seem to be 
valid. Sorokin has credited our current Sensate culture 
as being the cause of great upheaval in this century. 
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The way out can only come through careful introspection. 
Sorokin (1947) has also called for careful analysis of 
the current Sensate systems as a way of ameliorating the 
efforts of cultural transition. Capra (1982) calls for 
more than just superficial change. He states: 
A thorough change in the mentality of Western 
culture must naturally be accompanied by a 
profound modification of most spcial relation-
ships and forms of social organization--by 
changes that will go far beyond the superficial 
measures of economic and political readjustment 
being considered by today's political leaders. 
(p. 33) 
As with Sorokin, Capra hopes these changes will be 
harmonious and peaceful (Capra, 1982). Kuhn (1970) has 
suggested that such profound changes in social structure 
are usually resisted by those in power. Kuhn (1970) 
suggests that old ways of thinking, which he describes as 
paradigms, rarely are accepted immediately. He point,s to 
the fact that Newton's work was not generally accepted 
until many years after publication (Kuhn, 1970). Yet 
Kuhn feels that the shift from one paradigm to another 
cannot be forcefully imposed (Kuhn, 1970). He states: 
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to 
paradigm is a conversion experienced that cannot 
be forced. Lifelong resistance, particularly 
from those whose productive careers have 
committed them to an older tradition of normal 
science, is not a violation of scientific 
research itself. The course of resistance is the 
assurance that the. older paradigm will ultimately 
solve all its problems. (PP· 150-151) 
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If the current cultural. transition is irreversible, 
as Sorokin and Capra suggest, how are we to overcome the 
resistance to such a transition? While Kuhn was speaking 
of scientific resistance to change, we can apply his 
words to virtually every profession. The answer to this 
question may lie in our language base. 
Curriculum specialists must necessarily deal with any 
forthcoming paradigm shifts. Not to do so could prove 
fatal. Sorokin's works suggest that all institutions, 
including schools will 'be impacted by these changes. 
Capra (1982) suggests the language of the new science of 
Quantum Physics. In light of the implications of 
Sorokin's thesis, all suitable avenues to foster peaceful 
transition need to be examined. 
Empirical evidence lends support to Sorokin's general 
thesis. Astounding crime rates, general delinquency and 
a lost sense of purpose seem endemic .. in the period since 
World War II. Curriculum theorists largely have operated 
from a linear mindset and have failed to consider that 
our world is in a state of change. 
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Sorokin's image of transition is also supported by 
the political changes seen since World War II. Most 
recently, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of 
communism have created dramatic political change. 
Sorokin use.s the word chaos in his work a great deal. 
Chaos seems an appropriate word to use in describing our 
current world crisis. 
Additionally, Sorokirt seems to have anticipated the 
problems of the late twentieth century school. Dysfunc-
tional families, drugs, etc. are all discussed in 
Sorokin's works (Sorokin, 1947). It is important to 
remember that Sorokin was writing at a time when America 
was at its pinnacle. Generally, these social problems 
were not the front page news as they are today. 
As mentioned earlier~ Sorokin's works lend support 
for the need for a new language base for schools and for 
society in general. Chapter IV deals with the 
possibilities of the new quantum science to provide us 
with such a language. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW SCIENCE: METAPHOR FOR VIEWING 
TRANSFORMATIONAL THEORY 
Sorokin has described hciw a particular means of 
viewing the world came to dominate societies. His view 
that the current mindset, that of the mechanistic-linear 
mind based upon the language of Newton, is the dominant 
mindset, appears to be supportable. Sorokin states that 
dominant ideologies eventually wear themselves out, or 
simply eventually fail to meet the needs of society 
(Sorokin, 1950). Others have written extensively about 
how dominant idealogies came to change. In the area of 
the history of science, Thomas s. Kuhn has perhaps been 
the most noted. Kuhn uses the term paradigm to discuss 
how visions of reality are formed and to describe how 
these visions came to change. 
Kuhn's Concept of Paradigms 
Kuhn (1970) believes that scientists come to share 
common beliefs and assumptions. These shared beliefs 
eventually came to be so widely accepted as to form a 
paradigm. Kuhn does not see science as merely the work 
of individual scientists seeking to find scientific 
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meaning. Rather, he feels it is the paradigm that 
provides the criteria by which scientists work (Phillips, 
1987). While scientists may enlarge the paradigm, for 
the most part they work almost exclusively within the 
bounds of that paradigm (Phillips, 1987). Consequently, 
the paradigm can become,very restrictive. As Kuhn (1973) 
states: 
Few people who are not actually practitioners of 
a mature science realize how much mop-up work of 
this sort a paradigm leaves to be done or quite 
how fascinating such work can prove in the 
execution •.. M~pping-up operations are what engage 
most scientists throughout their careers. They 
constitute what I am here calling normal science. 
Closely examined, whether historically or in the 
contemporary laboratory, that enterprise seems an 
attempt to force nature into the preformed and 
relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
already supplies. (Phillips, 1987, p. 21) 
This description by Kuhn is particularly revealing for it 
shows how Kuhn conceives paradigms to be confining. With 
such restrictive parameters, it is little wonder that 
dominant paradigms appears to last for long periods of 
time. They tend to dominate the scientific field. To 
veer from the paradigm is to risk the scorn of your 
fellow scientists. To go outside the paradigm is 
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tantamount to scientific heresy. Paradigms then tend to 
guide research problems. Moreover, researchers come to 
see the paradigm as central to their being. They are 
unable, or perhaps unwilling to give it up (Hergenhahn, 
1986). Glieck (1987) describes how the scientific 
community reacted to the introduction of the new language 
of chaos theory: 
Every scientist who turned to chaos early had a 
story to tell of discouragement or open 
hostility. Graduate students were warned that 
their careers could be jeopardized if they wrote 
theses in an untested discipline, in which their 
advisors had no expertise. A particle physicist 
hearing about this new mathematics, might begin 
playing with it's own, thinking it was a beautiful 
thing, but beautiful and hard--but would feel 
that he could never tell his colleagues about it. 
Older professors felt they were suffering a kind 
of midlife crisis, gambling on a line of research 
that many colleagues were likely to misunderstand 
or resent. (p. 37) 
Kuhn's description of how dominant scientific paradigms 
come to dominate all scientific research, seems to mirror 
the philosophy of Sorokin. Sorokin (1941) described how 
the dominant Sensate culture of the modern Western world 
came to dominate our system of truth: 
Hence it follows that the senso;y cultures regard 
investigations of the nature of God and supersen-
sory phenomena as superstitious or fruitless 
speculation. Theology and religion, as a body of 
revealed truth, are at best 'tolerated, just as 
many hobbies are tol~rated; or are given mere lip 
service; 0~ are transformed into a kind of 
scientific theology, and sensory religion reduced 
to the level of empirical disciplines devoid of 
revealed truth. (p. 86) 
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While Sorokin does not use the word'paradigm, it is clear 
he is speaking of a Kuhnian type paradigm, one that comes 
to determine what is truth. In Sorokin's view the 
dominant paradigm eventually impacts virtually every 
aspect of society. 
Kuhn's Concept of Paradigm Shifts 
If, as Kuhn implies, the.dominant paradigm determines 
that which is legitimate science how do new paradigms 
come into existence? Kuhn (1970) states that it is the 
appearance of anomalies that cause the dominant paradigm 
to begin to be questioned. If enough anomalies appear 
the paradigm may be deemed inadequate. Anderson, Hughes, 
Sharrock (1986) in regard to Kuhn's concept of how para-
digm shifts occur state: 
Out of the ferment that occurs during the break-
up of an established paradigm, one new framework 
gradually emerges. This is popularized and 
adopted. The new framework has novel and 
different standards of measurement, new topics 
methods, concepts and problems. Most of all, it 
enables new observations to be made. Scientists 
see things differently ..• The anomalies gradually 
keep up until they become intolerable. Everyone 
becomes convinced of the inadequacy of the 
existing paradigm and the search for a new one 
starts. The revolution begins once more. (p. 
251) 
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This description of how paradigms shift places Kuhn's 
philosophy in line with Sorokin's views. While Kuhn is 
speaking almost strictly from the viewpoint of scientific 
methodology, Sorokin is speaking of the inability of the 
current social paradigm (that of the Sensate culture) to 
provide for the needs of society. Kuhn's scientific 
anomalies can be seen as Sorokin's societal anomalies. 
Chapter II of this dissertation attempted to explain 
the emergence of the Newtonian mindset in the Western 
world. The replacement of this dominant paradigm, if one 
follows Kuhn's logic, could only come about when the 
language or rules of that paradigm come into question. 
The early twentieth century saw the development of new 
scientific thinking that has brought Newtonian science 
102 
into question. The science of quantum physics, which can 
best be described as the study of science at the sub-
atomic level, has rendered much of the Newtonian world 
view inadequate. Quantum physips has presented the 
scientific community with far too many anomalies to allow 
a steadfast adherence to the Newtonian paradigm. As Kuhn 
(1973) has described, the scientific community seems to 
have undergone a transformation in its thinking. 
Capra ( 198'4) believes that qua;ntum physics has 
influenced all aspects of society. He states: 
Modern physics has had a profound influence on 
almost all aspects of human society. It has 
become the basis of natural science, and the 
combination of natural and technical science has 
fundamentally changed the conditions of life on 
our earth, both in beneficial and detrimental 
ways ... The exploration of the atomic and 
subatomic world in the twentieth century has 
revealed an unsuspected limitation of classical 
ideas, and has necessitated a radical revision of 
many of our basic concepts. (p. 3) 
Capra (1984) is convinced that the new science of quantum 
physics is propelling us toward a new paradigm. A para-
digm which will effect not only the scientific community, 
but our entire world view (Capra, 1984, pp. 3-4). A 
careful examination of the philosophical implications of 
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quantum physics lends credence to Capra's thesis. When 
examined from a philosophical perspective, Kuhn's view of 
how paradigms begin and then shift, and Sorokin's 
prediction of an emerging culture which seems to be 
taking us away from the deterministic Newtonian world 
view, take on interesting parallels to the science of 
quantum physics. 
The Philosophical Implications of 
the New Science 
Despite the fact that the science of quantum physics 
has been with us for the better part of the twentieth 
century, we have been slow to embrace the philosophical 
implications of this new science. Randall (1940) 
suggests that it is normal for us to try and put the new 
discoveries into the old equations. Randall (1940) seems 
to believe as Kuhn did that it is in the best interest of 
the old paradigm to try and make the new fit. But 
beginning with Einstein and Planck, the implications of 
quantum theory have caused inevitable cracks in the 
jargon of deterministic philosophy. 
Albert Einstein's theories were among the first to 
bring the linear-deterministic aspects of Newtonian 
science into question. Einstein as a teenager posed a 
question to himself that would eventually have a profound 
influence on the world: "What would the world look like 
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if I rode on a beam of light?" (Bronowski, 1973, p. 
247). By asking this question, young Einstein began an 
intellectual pursuit that would eventually lead him to 
construct his theory of relativity. In 1905 Einstein 
published a paper entitled On the Electrodynamics of 
Moving Bodies, (Untermeyer, 1955-). In this e_ssay 
Einstein called into question the Newtonian concept of a 
linear and fixed notion of time and space (Untermeyer, 
1955, p. 534). For Einstein had provided an answer to 
the boyhood questions he had posed to himself. Einstein 
(1905) carried forward his question in his essay as 
follows: 
Suppose this tram were moving away from that 
clock on the very beam with which we see what the 
clock says. Then, of cours'e, the clock would be 
frozen. I, the tram, this box riding on the beam 
of light would be fixed in time. Time would have 
to stop •.. Let me spell that out. Suppose the 
clock behind me says 'noon' when I leave I now 
travel 186,000 miles away from it at the speed of 
light; that ought to take me one second. But the 
time on the clock, as I see it, still says 
'noon', because it takes the beam light from the 
clock exactly as long as it has taken me. So far 
as the clock as I see it, so far as the universe 
inside the tram is concerned, in keeping up with 
the speed of light I have cut myself off from the 
passage of time. (Bronowski, 1973, pp. 247-248) 
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By demonstrating that motion and rest are relative, 
Einstein had called into question the very core of 
Newtonian science. Untermeyer (1955), states: 
Newton's followers were convinced that motion and 
rest were absolute and measurable; Einstein 
demonstrated that motion and rest are relative: 
measured differently by different observers. 
From this starting point, he proceeded to 
demolish the more sacred absolutism of length, 
mass, and time--the three fundamental measures on 
which all other quantities depend. (p. 534) 
Indeed, Einstein had presented Newtonian science with a 
whole series of Kuhnian anomalies. Bronowski (1973) 
described just how foreign'this new concept was to the 
Newtonian view. He states: , 
For Newton, time and space formed an absolute 
framework, within which the material events of 
the world ran their course in imperturbable 
order. His is a God's eye view of the world; it 
looks the same to every observer, wherever he is 
and however he travels. ', By contrast,· Einstein's 
is a man's eye view, in which what you see and 
what I see is relative to each of us, that is, to 
our place and speed. And this relativity cannot 
be removed. We cannot know what the world is 
like in itself we can only compare what it looks 
like to each of us, by the practical procedure of 
exchanging messages. (p.~ 249) 
When Einstein's General Theory of Relativity was 
confirmed in a series of experiments conducted by the 
Royal Society of Brazil in May of 1919, the Newtonians 
had little left upon which to base their objections 
(Bronowski, 1973, p. 254). The philosophical conse-
quences of Einstein's theories were already being 
formulated by 1919. 
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It is interesting to note that many see Einstein as 
more of a philosopher than a mathematician (Bronowski, 
1973). As stated earlier, this new philosophy based on 
the concept of relativity dealt a heavy blow to the 
deterministic philosophy. Einstein (1955) spoke directly 
of the determinist philosophy of David Hume when he 
states: 
By his clear critique Hume did not only advance 
philosophy in a decisive way but also--through no 
fault of his--created a danger for philosophy 
that, following his critique, a fateful "fear of 
metaphysics" arose which has come to be a malady 
of contemporary empiricistic philosophizing; this 
malady is the counterpart to that earlier 
philoso-phizing in the clouds, which thought it 
could neglect and dispense with what was given by 
the senses. (Levi, 1959, p. 260) 
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There can be no doubt from reading the above passage that 
Einstein was attacking the strict empiricist views 
brought about by Newtonian principles. It is significant 
that he states 'that Hume came to this conclusion "through 
no fault of his own" (Levi, 1959, p. 240). Einstein 
seems to imply, as Kuhn has alluded to, that Hume was 
simply a victim of the dominant paradigm. Einstein here 
does not reject empiricism entirely. Rather, by alluding 
to metaphysical possibilities and sense experience, he 
seems to be advancing a philosophy which would consider 
both as viable. This constitutes a combination similar 
to Sorokin's Integral culture. In that culture Sorokin 
(1949) states that the Integral system in its ultimate 
reality is as follows: 
Its ultimate principle proclaims that the true 
reality-value is an Infinite Manifold which has 
supersensory, rational, and sensory forms 
inseparable from one another •.• it includes the 
empirical as well as the superempirical aspects 
of reality, science as well as philosophy and 
theology. (Oliver, 1989, p. 28) 
If Sorokin was correct in his belief that the Sensate 
culture of the post Enlightenment era will give way to an 
Integral culture, Einstein's theories emerge as a 
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legitimate metaphor for such a change. Einstein's 
philosophy is indeed a holistic philosophy. Sensory 
perception is accepted, but not in isolation from the 
metaphysical aspects of philosophy. By alluding to 
',, 
metaphysical supposition, Einstein was going against the 
grain of over three hundred years of philosophical 
rhetoric. He seemed to be anticipating what late 
twentieth century philosophers, including curriculum 
experts, are calling holism. Einstein (1939), in a 
somewhat doubt-ridden statement, seemed to call for a 
more holistic view: 
I see on the one side the totality of sense 
experiences, and, on the other the totality of 
the concepts and propositions themselves are of a 
strictly logical nature ...• The concepts and 
propositions get "meaning", i.e., "content" only 
through their connections with sense experiences. 
The connection of the latter with the former is 
purely intuitive. (Levi, 1959, p. 260) 
By bringing intuition into the arena, Einstein calls for 
more than strict empiricism. We gain meaning through 
sense experience but only when it is connected with the 
non-logical. Reality, according to Einstein, is 
relative. We cannot find as simple a solution to the 
mysteries of the universe as Newtonian mechanics had once 
promised. For philosophy, the mysterious (metaphysical) 
could now be legitimately debated once again, with the 
blessings of no less a genius than Albert Einstein. 
109 
The quandary for the Positivists was that with 
science now giving credence to the intuitive approach, 
subjective reality was no longer so easy to dismiss. 
Pagels (1982) states, "A strong antipositivist element 
central to Einstein's method is the intuitional leap from 
experience which sets up the absolute postulate in the 
first place" (p. 58). Science, which had given the 
Positivists its credibility was now a very real 
consideration for science (Pagels, 1982, p. 58). 
It is important to note that Einstein did not abandon 
classical theory (Pagels, 1982). In fact, Einstein 
sought to provide a single unified theory that would 
allow Classical Newtonian science and quantum physics, 
along with his own relativistic notions, to exist side by 
side (Levi, 1959). Einstein (1940) sought to improve 
physics not destroy it (Levi, 1959, p, 264). He states: 
•.. it cannot be claimed that those parts of the 
general relativity theory which can today (1940) 
be regarded as final have furnished physics with 
a complete and satisfactory foundation. In the 
first place, the total field appears to be 
composed of two logically unconnected parts, the 
gravitational and the electromagnetic. And in 
the second place, this theory, like the other 
field theories, has not up till now supplied an 
explanation of the atomistic structure of matter. 
This failure has probably some connection with 
the fact that so far it has contributed nothing 
to the understanding of quantum phenomena. 
(Levi, 1959, p. 264) 
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In this passage Einstein held out the belief that his own 
relativity theory and quantum mechanics could be unified. 
But how so? Einstein was never able to resolve this in 
his lifetime (Pagels, 1982). However, it is clear that 
he believed the resolution was ultimately to incorporate 
metaphysical issues (Levi, 1959). Meanwhile·, the further 
development of quantum theory, which Einstein viewed as 
too superficial, was moving even further away from 
deterministic physics (Pagels, 1982, p. 61). 
Quantum Physics: Metaphor for 
Cultural Transformation 
Einstein had p~oven that time and space were not the 
absolutes as once supposed. He was to maintain that the 
event is the thing which reality must be focused on, not 
the point in space or the instant in time (Einstein, 
1955, p. 30). Quantum physics, in much the same way, has 
brought into question the absolutes proposed by the 
Newtonian paradigm. Max Planck (1858-1947) began his 
work on the problem of black-body radiation in the early 
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part of the twentieth century. Planck proved that such 
radiation was emitted in discrete amounts called quanta 
(Zukav, 1979). This contrasted with the prevailing 
scientific view that such ra~i~tion was emitted in 
constant variables. Planck, like Einstein, had shown 
that the laws put forth by Newtonian science simply did 
not conform to a!'l levels of activity. At the sub-atomic 
level strange things indeed were occurring. As Stromberg 
(1966) states: 
The world within the atom soon became most 
puzzling, the behavior of electrons breaking all 
sorts of laws,heretofore regarded as sacrosanct. 
At the turn of the century, Max Planck's quantum 
theory asserted that energy is emitted discretely 
and not continuously, in little packages, as 
particles of matter would be expected to behave: 
they did not bounce or eject the way "ordinary" 
objects do in the everyday world. (p. 346) 
Planck was able to bring into question the laws upon 
which modern physics had been built. Kuhn (1970) has 
suggested that paradigm shifts are often invisible to 
participants in them. Planck demonstrated that the world 
of sub-atomic particles could no longer remain hidden. 
Scientists were faced with an anomaly of great 
proportions. For his work Planck was awarded the Nobel 
prize in physics in 1981. Even the great Einstein was 
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moved to comment on the discoveries of Planck. In 1914 
he states: 
About fifteen years ago nobody had yet doubted 
that a correct account of the electrical, optical 
and thermal properties was possible on the basis 
of Galilee-Newtonian mechanics applied to the 
movement of molecules •.. Then Planck showed that 
in order to establish a law of heat radiation 
consonant with experience, it was necessary to 
employ a method of calculation the 
incompatibility of which with the principles of 
classical physics became clearer and 
clearer ••. with this quantum hypothesis he 
dethroned classical phys~cs as applied to the 
case where sufficiently small masses are moved at 
sufficiently low speeds and high rates of 
acceleration, so ·that today the laws of motion 
proposed by Galilee and Newton can be allowed 
validity as limiting_ laws·. (Levi, 1959, pp.· 250-· 
251) 
The great Newton's laws were at last being seen as 
limited. This was a great contrast to the view of the 
Age of Enlightenment of the seventeenth century. For the 
Enlightenment had posed Newton's laws as the laws of 
progress. Laws that would forever take us forward. That 
they might be limited in their ability to answer certain 
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questions was a disturbing revelation to many. Just as 
Einstein had unsettled the scientific and philosophic 
communities, Planck did so too. 
Neils Bohr (1985-1962) soon added to Planck's work. 
Bohr's work centered on what science referred to as the 
particle wave paradox., Evidence existed to suggest that 
in some instances that photons and electrons behave like 
corpuscles, and at other times they behaved as waves 
(Levi, 1959). Bohr (1934) was to reason that the 
particle and wave qualities were complementary views of 
the same reality. Capra (1982) feels that Bohr's 
resolution to the particle/wave paradox forced physicists 
to call into question the foundations of the mechanistic 
world (p. 80). He states: 
At the subatomic level, matter does not exist 
with certainty at definite places, but rather 
shows "tendencies to exist", and atomic events do 
not occur with certainty at definite times and in 
definite ways but rather show tendencies to 
occur". In the formalism of quantum mechanics, 
these tendencies are expressed as probabilities. 
(p. 80) 
The language of physics, and subsequently science in 
general, was now faced with having to deal with 
probabilities and not certainties. The "double whammy" 
of Einstein's Relativity theories and quantum physics 
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served as a horrific blow to the Positivists. The 
obtainment of absolute certainty suddenly appeared out of 
reach. 
The challenge to the determinists did not end with 
Bohr. In 1925 Karl Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) set 
forth a new theory of quantum mechanics based upon 
certain aspects of Bohr's earlier works (Levi, 1959, p. 
257). Heinsenberg'speculated that both position and 
momentum of a particle were not capable of being measured 
simultaneously. He was to demonstrate mathematically 
that to know the position of a particle was to be 
"uncertain" of the momentum of that particle (Pagels, 
1982). In short, Heinsenberg was to add further to the 
growing realization that indeterminacy was to guide the 
field of physics in the future. Heisenberg postulated 
that the observer would always ·interfere with that which 
was being observed (Pagels, 1982). He further implied 
that meaningful observation could occur only when the 
observer interacted with the object (Heisenberg, 1974, p. 
81). 
The combined works of Bohr, and Heisenberg became 
known as the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of quantum 
mechanics (Pagels, 1982, p. 87). Together they had 
proved that the Newtonian framework for physics at the 
sub-atomic level was simply not adequate to explain 
certain phenomena. Knowledge based upon Newtonian logic 
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was thus called into question. 
The Philosophical Implications of 
the New Science 
Positivist philosophy seeks to know the qualities of 
an object beyond question. Empirical evidence was needed 
to establish such certainties. As has been stated 
quantum-mechanic's insinuates that such certainties are 
not likely to be obtained. Reality is not always as it 
seems. Empirical evidence alone may or may not provide 
certainty. The determinacy of the Newtonian paradigm had 
brought forth a certain smugness in philosophical 
inquiry. Just when the Positivists seemed ready to 
pronounce their obtainment of reality, quantum physics, 
and its accompanying randomness, pressed forward. Pagels 
(1982) states, "the very act of attempting to establish 
determinism produces indeterminism" (p. 86). In other 
words, the more certainty we seek in the quantum world 
the more paradoxes we ar.e presented. From the po.sitivist 
perspective this would seem to be a disaster. Taken from 
a different perspective it need not be. Pagels (1982) 
-
describes the determinists reaction to the randomness of 
quantum physics. He states: 
It is this very randomness that makes the deter-
minist recoil. Physics, as it was conceived of 
for centuries, was supposed to predict precisely 
what can happen in nature. In the quantum 
theory, only probabilities are precisely 
determined, and the determinist finds it 
difficult to renounce the hope that behind 
quantum reality a deterministic reality exists. 
But in fact the quantum theory has closed the 
door on determinism. (p. 86) 
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Pagels (1982) does not believe knowledge to ·be 
unobtainable but prefers to see the realization of a 
random world as the door to a new vision (Pagels, 1982, 
p. 86). He states: 
To the contrary, the discovery of the 
indeterminate universe is a triumph of modern 
physics and opens a new vision of nature. The 
new quantum theory makes lots of predictions--all 
in agreement with experiment. But these 
predictions are for the distribution of events, 
not individual events--it is like predicting how 
many time~ a specific hand of cards gets dealt on 
the average. (p. 86) 
By implying that science must move to a more intuitive 
mode of thought to comprehend the universe more fully, 
quantum physics calls forth modes of thought previously 
discounted in the Newtonian paradigm. Metaphysics could 
now be placed back into the scientific community. 
Philosophers began to see metaphysics something more than 
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mere fantasy. The language base of Newtonian science 
merged wi~h the concepts of the new science holds promise 
for establishing a new pa,radigm of thought, a paradigm 
richer and more capable of.Qealing with the problems of 
the modern·world. 
Speculations on the Emerging Paradigm 
of New Science 
Capra (1981) has identified five criteria for viewing 
what he calls an emergent paradigm based on the new 
science of quantum physics. His criteria are based on an 
holistic view of nature. He also uses the terms 
ecological and systematic to describe the new paradigm 
(Capra, 1991, p. xi). Ferg~son (1980), Pagels (1982), 
and Zukav (1979) have also used similar terminology to 
describe an emergent paradigm built on the language of 
quantum physics. Capra's criteria are as follows: 
In the new paradigm, the relationship between the 
parts and the whole is reversed. The properties· 
of the parts can only be understood from the 
dynamics of the whole. Ultimately, there are no 
parts at all. What we call a part is merely a 
pattern in an inseparable web of relationships. 
(Capra, 1991, p. xii) 
This portion of Capra's thesis goes to the heart of 
quantum physics. Reductionism does not lead to full 
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understanding. Quantum physics necessitates looking at 
the whole to comprehend the various components of an 
object. Ferguson (1980) also calls for a new world 
vision based upon holism. She states, "modern science 
has verified the quality of whole-making, the 
characteristic of nature to ·put things Eogether in as 
ever-more synergistic meaningful pattern" (Ferguson, 
1980, p. 156). The'Newtonian paradigm of science 
suggests that the whole is understood through its parts 
(Capra, 1991). The new paradigm based on quantum physics , 
clearly contradicts this concept. 
Capra (1991) also maintains that the new science 
calls for a process approach. He suggests that all 
relationships are dynamic and are part of an underlying 
process (Capra, 1991, p. xii). He states: 
In the new paradigm the,, relationship between the 
parts and the whole is reversed. The meaning of 
individual dogmas can be understood only from the 
dynamics of revelations as a whole. Ultimately 
revelation as a process is of one piece. 
Individual dogmas focus on particular moments in 
God's self-manifestation in nature, history and 
human experience. (p. xii) 
Capra has emphasized process over atomization. Pagels 
(1982) has also suggested that process is integral to the 
method of quantum physics. Einstein also suggested that 
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science would have to proceed based on deeper meanings, 
such as intuition (Calder, 1979). Ferguson (1980) also 
identifies a process approach in the new science. By 
calling for a process approach based on the new science, 
Capra challenges the supremacy of a particular culture or 
ideology (Capra, 1991). 
Capra (1991) identifies the objective nature of the 
old paradigm of Newtonian science. The human observer 
played no role in the descriptions of science (Capra, 
1991). Capra believes the new paradigm focuses on, as he 
calls it, "the understanding of the process of knowledge" 
(Capra, 1991, p. xiii). The human observer becomes 
integral in such a process view. Capra (1991) states: 
In the old paradigm descriptions were independent 
of the human observer and the process of 
knowledge ... At this point there is no consensus 
what the proper epistemology is, but there is an 
emerging consensus that epistemology will have to 
be an integral part of every scientific theory. 
(p. xiii) 
This shift from objective reality to an emphasis on ways 
of knowing began with the ideas of Einstein. Einstein 
indicated in his early writings that any hope of 
understanding the universe would probably be the result 
of nontraditional scientific methods (Medawar, 1984). 
The spiritual (theological) is elevated to a new purpose 
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in such a view. 
Capra (1991) also speaks of a shift in the use of 
metaphor with the new science. The new paradigm is seen 
as replacing the metaphor of-building to a metaphor of 
network. He places special emphasis on the 
interconnectedness of all objects (Capra,_ 1991). 
Finally Capra suggests that the new emerging paradigm 
will place special --emphasis- on the mysterious (Capra, 
1991). Capra (1991) states: 
The new paradigm, by greater emphasis on mystery, 
acknowledges-the limited and approximate 
character of ,every theolog~cal statement •.. The 
theologian, like every believer, finds ultimate 
truth not in the theological statement but in the 
reality to which this ~tatement gives a certain 
true, but limited expression. (p. xv) 
Under such a system science would deal more with 
approximates and not absolutes. All aspects of society 
and culture become aspects of truth. All dogmas are 
limited in their ability to express ultimate reality. 
Implications of the New Science 
to Sorokin 
Sorokin (1941) projected that Western culture was on 
the verge of great change. He speculated that such 
change was inevitable and could not be halted. He 
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presents us with a vision of culture in extreme despair, 
grasping for life~ Sorokin anticipated that the cultural 
transition would result in a new integrated culture 
(Sorokin, 1941, p. 25). Sorokin (1941) states: 
The tragedy and chaos, the horrors and sorrow of 
the transition period being over, they will 
evolve a new creative life, in a new integrated 
form, as magnificent in its own way as five 
centuries of sensate culture ... Moreover, such a 
change, however painful, seems to be the 
necessary condition for any culture and society 
to remain creative throughout their historical 
existence. No fundamental form of culture is 
infinite in its creative possibilities, but is 
limited. (p. 25) 
By addressing the possibility of an emerging paradigm, 
Sorokin has anticipated the theme of those espousing a 
new paradigm based on the new science of quantum physics. 
For transformation seems a logical consequenc~ of the 
quantum revolution. Sorokin's challenge to us is to 
limit the tragic aspects of cultural transformation 
(Sorokin, 1941). Sorokin (1941) states: 
We have the rare privilege of living, observing, 
thinking, and acting in the conflagration of such 
an ordeal. If we cannot stop it, we can at least 
try to understand its nature, its causes, and its 
consequences. If we do this, we may be able, to 
some extent, to shorten its tragic period and to 
mitigate its ravages. (p. 29) 
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Quantum physics, with its emphasis on holism, 
presents us with a possible metaphor to help us in the 
transition Sorokin speaks of. For holism implies that 
understanding is essential. Understanding of the whole 
and not just of particular situations. Sorokin implies 
that the crisis of the Sensate culture, which is centered 
in the old Newtonian paradigm, will impact all aspects of 
our lives (Sorokin., 1941). Consequently, there would 
seem to be a great need for a language base that would 
allow us to make a peaceful transition. Quantum physics 
views Newtonian logic as a partial truth. By merging the 
old (Newtonian logic) with the new (quantum-theory) a new 
language base may emerge. Such language could allow for 
competing groups to come to an understanding. Ferguson 
(1980) hints at such a possibility. She states: 
A new paradigm involves a principle that was 
present all along but unknown to us. It includes 
the old as a partial truth, one aspect of how 
things work, while allowing for things to work in 
other ways as well. By its larger perspective, 
it transforms traditional knowledge and the 
stubborn new observations, reconciling their 
apparent contradictions. (Ferguson, 1980, p. 27) 
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Kuhn (1970) has stated that old paradigms die hard. 
Those with a vested interest in keeping the old paradigm 
intact are not likely to give up quickly. But the 
language of the new science allows the old guard to keep 
their old language to an extent. Hope then emerges for a 
peaceful transition. Furthermore, the new science of 
quantum physics has presented science and philosophy with 
a number of anomalies that seem to bring the Newtonian 
paradigm into question. 
Ferguson (1980) states that we are learning to 
recognize that a transition is underway (Ferguson, 1980, 
p. 407). She states, "we are learning to read tenden-
cies, to recognize the early signs of another, more 
promising paradigm (Ferguson, 1980, p. 407). Ferguson's 
words mesh with those of Sorokin. Sorokin (1941) 
repeatedly speaks of the emerging Integral culture as a 
superior culture. 
Sorokin (1941, 1947) states that the crisis of the 
Sensate culture was a crisis that would impact all 
aspects of society. Curriculum theorists it can be 
reasoned, are not to be exempt from these changes. 
Schools have generally been viewed as agents for social 
change. The language of the new science and the works of 
Sorokin give curriculum theorists ample reason to 
consider the implications of their views. 
Reference was made in an earlier chapter to the 
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Carnegie report on education, A Nation at Risk. 
Certainly, many people in America view our society and 
our schools as being at risk. Sorokin has demonstrated 
that the Sensate culture with its emphasis on materialism 
is incapable of solving the crisis. A survey of American 
society leads me to concur with his thesis. How then are 
we to deal with the crisis? Some suggest that a new 
language base is needed to avert full scale disaster in 
our society. Such a language base needs to hold forth 
promise, not despair. 
The language of quantum physics suggests hope. We 
are lead to a vision of wholeness through the quantum 
meta-phor. A new vision of reality is called for through 
the quantum metaphor that embraces the spiritual 
(intuitive) as well as the objective. Absolutes which 
have been touted by the Newtonian paradigm, are brought 
into ques-tion by this new language. Certainty is no 
longer the goal of the classroom, but understanding is. 
It is, in short, a language of hope. 
The new language of quantum physics does not accept 
the fragmentation of the old Newtonian paradigm. We are 
forced by quantum mechanics to look at the whole 
structure before any real understanding can take place. 
Put another way, the atomization of knowledge can no 
longer suffice as a legitimate way of knowing under the 
new science. Fragmentation would seem to lead us in a 
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circle of futility. 
Modern society has placed great emphasis on the 
breaking down and analyzing of facts. While this process 
can work in a limited sense, it can be a hindrance. 
Sorokin has indicated that his Integral culture is a 
culture that accepts aspects of other cultures, and views 
them as aspects of truth. Western culture has grown 
increasingly unaccepting of methods that fail to meet 
scientific standards. This very adherence to scientific 
method is reflective of the overripe Sensate culture 
described by Sorokin, in that all contrary views are 
disregarded as unscientific. 
The reinstatement of words such as mysterious 
mystical, uncertainty, etc. into science seems strange 
indeed to the Newtonian mindset. However, such words are 
commonplace in the quantum paradigm. Such words give 
hope to the human spirit and can possibly give us answers 
to the "crisis of our age" that Sorokin spoke of. 
Curriculum, as has been demonstrated, seems to be 
mired in the language of Newtonian science. This is 
logical given the widespread effects of Newtonian logic 
on all aspects of Western society. Yet, by examining the 
alternative paradigm of quantum mechanics, we are drawn 
to a conclusion that our current methods of curriculum 
theorizing are far too limited. 
From my study of the emergence of the Newtonian 
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paradigm as the dominant mindset in Western society, I 
have concluded that we indeed have become over reliant on 
its tenant as our basis of truth. The science of quantum 
physics leads me to conclude that a fuller, more 
appropriate language base is available from which to 
construct curriculum theory. , 
CHAPTER V 
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CURRICULUM THEORISTS 
Sorokin (1941) in his work The Crisis of Our Age 
predicted that the last half of the twentieth century 
would be an age of chaos. His thesis stemmed from the 
contention that cultures in a state of revolution are 
prone to chaotic convulsions (Sorokin, 1941, 1947). 
There would seem to be ample evidence to support 
Sorokin's thesis. Curriculum workers, in particular, are 
faced with dealing with the sudden, and often violent, 
changes of our times. Based on a recent government 
study, the plight of children in the last quarter century 
has not been good (Federal Study, 1992). The study 
states, "American children are in trouble" (Federal 
Study, 1992). Several factors were mentioned as 
contributors to the current state of affairs. The study 
commissioned by the federal government states: 
They point to steadily decreasing spending on 
child rearing by government and households in the 
last 30 years and changing cultural forces, 
including the effects of divorce, television, 
waning religion and more permissive society, as 
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factors fueling the trend. (Dallas Morning News, 
1992, p. 1) 
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Interestingly, the authors of the government study 
encourage legislation and government spending as the 
possible solution to the problem (Daily Oklahoman, 1992, 
p. 1). But this solution has been offered many times 
before and has not solved the current crisis. The 
cultural crisis described by Sorokin involves all aspects 
of society (Sorokin, 1941). Sorokin suggests that any 
solutions to the crisis must come as a result of a 
transformation of our thinking (Sorokin, 1941, 1947). 
Thus, curriculum workers must begin to explore the 
implications of such a transition and begin to shape a 
language base from which to work. Kuhn (1970), as has 
been stated in Chapter II, tells us that such shifts in 
thinking are very difficult and often are met with 
extreme resistance. Kuhn (1970) states, "lifelong 
resistance, particularly from those whose particular 
careers have been committed to the older paradigm will 
resist change" (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 150-151). It is not 
surprising that "solutions" to our current crisis are 
most always formed in the language of the day. Apple 
(1975) believes that these modes of thought have become 
so entrenched as to be "taken for granted" (p. 121). 
Kuhn (1970) believes that we will go to almost any 
extreme to make sure that the current paradigm is upheld. 
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Even if that means forcing the paradigm to fit reality 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 135). But in the long run such forcing 
does not solve the problems. The inability of the old 
paradigm to create genuine solutions to the crisis 
remains. 
Curriculum theorists have been trained in a 
particular paradigm and they too are resistant to change. 
Dobson, Dobson, and Smiley (1991) refer to this as an 
allegiance to conventional wisdom (p. 41). They state, 
"conventional wisdom also can contaminate curriculum 
knowledge construction efforts" (Dobson, Dobson, and 
Smiley, 1991, p. 41). Allegiance to the conventional 
wisdom (dominant paradigm) hampers any efforts to come to 
viable solutions to curriculum problems. 
The current mindset of the majority of curriculum 
workers appears to be that qf the rational scientific 
mode (Schopen, 1989). Curriculum workers such as 
Franklin Bobbitt (1918), Ralph Tyler (1949) and Madeline 
Hunter (1984) all reflect the dominant scientific 
rationale in their writings. In such a model curriculum 
theory tends to work on an industrial/technological 
mentality (Brown, 1989, p. 10). Economic and social 
advancement became the primary goals upon which schooling 
is based (Purpel, 1989, p. 18). Purpel (1989) states: 
This means that the dominant culture and the 
dominant professional community have committed 
themselves to facilitating the conception of the 
school as a place where students compete and 
where they may expect to learn the necessary 
require-ments for economic and social 
advancement. Thi's concern for acculturation does 
not necessarily exclude but certainly distracts 
us from serious reexamination of our basic 
premises. It does not reflect a commitment to 
moral or aesthetic excellence or a commitment to 
nourish the imagina-tion or the idealism of our 
students. (p. 18) 
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Purpel is very critical of what he calls the 
cultural, "status quo" (Purpel, 1989, p. 18). Sorokin 
(1941) has theorized that cultures in their last stages 
tend to fight hard to maintain a status quo. Sorokin 
(1941) writings tend to lend support to Purpel's 
contention regarding the role(s) of our schools. Sorokin 
(1941) wrote the following passage regarding the role of 
schools: 
Of like character is the educational system, 
which is first and foremost a training school 
devoteq to "useful knowledge" and the crafts. 
Its chief business is to prepare successful 
businessmen, craftsmen, engineers and 
technicians, politicians, lawyers, doctors, 
teachers, preachers, and so on. Mastery is 
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sought in such arts as amassing a fortune, 
farming, home cooking, research work, 
teaching ••. scant attention, if any, is paid to 
the forgotten purpose of real knowledge and 
' ' 
wisdom: the nature of true reality and values. 
(p. 101) 
According to Sorokin schools have traditionally 
served to support the dominant paradigm in existence at 
the time (Sorokin, 1941). Curriculum then becomes 
grounded in the dominant paradigm and are often unable to 
create reasonable alternatives for the educational 
process. Problems go unsolved and the dominant ideology 
upon which our schools is based goes unchallenged. 
Innovation and cre~tivity, ~which are described as new 
ways of seeing the world, tend to be ignored. Apple 
(1990) quotes Sigel (1950) as saying: 
There is probably little doubt that the public 
schools are a choice transmission belt for the 
traditional rather than the inno~ative, much less 
the radical. As a result, they facilitate the 
political socialization of the mainstream young 
and tend to equip them with the tools necessary 
for the particular roles they are expected to 
' play in a given society. One may wish to quarrel 
with the differential roles the government and 
the schools assign to students, but it would 
probably be considerably more difficult to deny 
the school's effectiveness. (p. 85) 
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Problems arise when what schools are transmitting to 
students fail to meet the demands of a changing culture. 
While although still in a preeminent position, the 
dominant paradigm may not be serving society to its 
fullest. To Sorokin (1941, 1947), the dying Sensate 
culture based upon the mechanistic metaphor of the 
Newtonian paradigm, is no longer capable of solving the 
crisis of our age. To Sorokin the age of materaalism has 
proven to be an unsatisfactory model. New avenues for 
solving problems must be found. 
If modernity as exhibited by Sorokin's Sensate 
culture is an inadequate model for our schools to follow, 
what are the alternatives? Sorokin implies that a more 
holistic approach must be found to complete our 
understanding of our role(s) in the cosmos (Oliver, 
1989). By moving in that direction we must embrace new 
ways of knowing. We cannot reject that which does not 
fit into the mechanistic model. Oliver (1989) agrees 
with Sorokin's point. He states: 
We would agree with Sorokin that the major 
challenge of working toward a new and positive 
conception of culture is not the discounting or 
costing out of some quality or feeling or 
understanding, but rather the inclusion of 
aspects of universe/nature which have tended to 
be underappreciated. (p. 29) 
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The scientific paradigm based on the Newtonian view 
of nature has placed its emphasis on the empirical-
materialistic aspects o.f reality. In earlier chapters it 
was demonstrated how the Newtonian mindset has permeated 
virtually all aspects of Western culture. To move beyond 
this mindset, and consequently to a new way of knowing, 
will require much debate. Curriculum workers are faced 
with the task of fostering the debate. Many curriculum 
workers suggest the debate should be centered on the need 
to move to a more holistic paradigm based upon the new 
science of quantum physics. 
The New Science: Metaphor 
for Curriculum Theorists 
Doll (1989) contends that Newtonian thought is at the 
foundation of present-day curriculum (p. 244). Doll 
(1989) states: 
My argument is that Newtonian thought is one of 
the foundations on which the present-day 
curriculum is based. Direct correlations can be 
made between Madeline Hunter's or Ralph Tyler's 
notions of a stable universe with planets 
rotating around the sun in perfect harmony. 
Harmony is definitely a modern, not a post-
modern, concept, but is the key ideal goal of a 
Tyler-Hunter curriculum. (p. 244) 
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With the Tyler-Hunter models we are pointed toward 
specific outcomes and moqels. The world is shown to be a 
specific and very rational place. Doll (1989) refers to 
such systems as reductionist (p. 244). Innovation is 
discouraged and perhaps even prohibited (Doll, 1989). 
These paradigms tend to focus on a body of knowledge and 
are not transformational (Doll, 1989, p. 244). Doll 
(1989) states: 
Disturbance is not viewed here as key, necessary, 
or desirable ingredient. Connections can also be 
made between B.F. Skinner's or James Popham's 
view of expressing learning in discrete, 
quantifiable and linear units and Newton's 
approach to calculus. Both are reductionist, 
assume the whole to be no more than the sum of 
the parts, and lead to a curriculum which is 
cumulative rather than transformative. (p. 244) 
In a period of cultural transformation a cumulative 
curriculum is most probably restrictive and 
inappropriate. The student emphasis in education on 
national testing and content driven curriculum is an 
example of the reductionist-cumulative mindset. This 
mindset is diametrically opposed to the post-modern view 
based upon the new science of quantum physics. Doll 
135 
(1989) identifies three characteristics of post-modern 
thought. Doll (1989) cites the following as the primary 
characteristics of post-modern thought: 
1. the nature of open (as opposed to closed 
systems). (p. 244) 
2. the structure of complexity (as opposed 
to simplicity). (p. 244) 
3. transformatory (as opposed to 
accumulative change). (p. 244) 
Each of Doll's criteria for post-modern thought 
provide a suitable arena for discussing the possibility 
of an emerging paradigm in curriculum. For if curriculum 
workers are to go beyond the current parameters of the 
curriculum field, metaphors must be found to facilitate 
debate. 
Open vs. Closed Systems 
Doll's idea of open systems vs. closed systems goes 
to the heart of transformational theory •. Doll (1989) 
states that, "open systems feed on flux of matter and 
energy coming to them from the outside world" (Doll, 
1989, p. 246). Doll (1989) believes that the new 
material (flux) actually serves to transform (Doll, 1989, 
p. 246). He contrasts this attitude to that of a closed 
system which has pre-set ends which seek to limit outside 
forces. Doll states, "a closed system, like Skinner's 
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teacher-proof-machines, wants to protect from the fluxes 
that compose nature" (Doll, 1989, p. 246). He contrasts 
that to the open system's approach. He states, "an open 
system, on the other hand, needs fluxes, perturbations, 
anomalies, errors: these are the triggers that set-off 
reorganization" (Doll, 1989, p. 246). 
Current curriculum practice seems closed indeed. 
Change is resisted by our current way of practicing 
curriculum. Proposals for "reform" .are grounded in 
predetermined language. Such language is unlikely to 
produce any substantial change since it is simply more of 
the same. Cultural transformation would appear to demand 
more than this from curriculum workers. Doll (1989) 
states: 
The curriculum implications here seem obvious-
namely curricularists should study open systems 
in both a metaphorical and literal sense. 
Metaphorically we should structure and study 
curriculum in such a manner that internal, 
autocatalytic transformations are encouraged to 
occur. Piaget called this phenocopy. In our 
present closed-system format this _concept is 
absurd: autocatalytic, transformative structures 
do not appear as part of the literature, and the 
'noise' which produces them is quickly and 
quietly factored out. (p. 246) 
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If one accepts the thesis that cultural 
transformation is inevitable and that our current 
cultural situation as described by Sorokin (1941), as a 
crisis is unacceptable, then an open system becomes 
imperative for responsible curriculum theorists. One key 
to fostering a move to an open-system of curriculum 
inquiry is the attitude of curriculum theorists to such 
inquiry. Dobson, Dobson, and Smiley (1991) state: 
Curriculum workers, either operating from 
established paradigms like "logical positivist 
thought" or from their own creations, should 
inquire into their own pe~ceived realities of 
curriculum. Inquiry that becomes too structured 
inflates the validity of a particular paradigm 
leading to confirmation bias. This mechanization 
of a particular paradigm by curriculum workers 
risks forced results. (p. 41) 
Inquiry would seem to be the key element to an open-
system of curriculum thought. The new science indicates 
that pre-set notions are likely to be inadequate. The 
inquiries of Einstein, Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, etc. all 
have indicated that the Newtonian model for science is 
limited. Inquiry, utilizing this message of the new 
science, would necessarily lead us to an open-system 
approach to curriculum. 
The Simple vs. the Complex 
Doll (1989) describes the universe of Newton as 
simple (p. 246). He states: 
Newton's universe was a simple universe. The 
mathematics is that of lines, trajectories, 
areas--all simple, linear concepts. Newton 
assumed the universe to be one large arithmetic 
grid with each set of co-ordinates proportionally 
consistent with every other set of co-ordinates. 
It was a view of posited harmony, order, 
uniformity. (p. 247) 
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Doll points out that this vision of simplicity has 
dominated the field of curriculum (Doll, 1989). 
Simplicity leads to objectivity. Current curriculum 
practice places a great deal of emphasis on objective 
outcomes. It is thought that we must be able to measure 
to maintain order. This mechanical view of reality has 
permeated the curriculum field and the social sciences in 
general. People in such a system are treated as objects 
(Lucas, 1985). Lucas (1985) states: 
Also implied by the posture of the scientific 
mechanist was the need for the same objective 
neutrality and analytic reductionism in the study 
of human behavior that had proven so successful 
in investigating physical phenomena. Psychology 
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would become a natural science. (p. 168) 
Such an approach to human behavior is limited and 
ignores the spiritual aspect of our existence. Doll's 
complexity model calls for a radical new view of nature. 
Complexity, Doll argues is an essential part of modern 
science (Doll, 1989). Doll (1989) states: 
Complexity became a part o~ the scientific world 
in the early decades of this-century when 
Einstein developed his theory of relativity and 
quantum physicists explored the strange world of 
the atom. Today complexity is a field of study 
in mathematics, in management, and in sociology. 
It is part of our daily lives. (p. 247) 
Doll maintains that complexity is well-like with 
numerous interacting forces (Doll, 1989, p. 247). Gang 
(1988) quotes Montessori's statement that, "no matter 
what we touch, an atom, or a cell, we cannot explain it 
without knowledge of the wider universe" (p. 15). Gang 
( 1988) maintains that holistic education is a mean.s of 
addressing the complexities of our universe. He 
describes such a system as "cosmic education" (Lucas, 
1988, p. 15). In a cosmic education children are made 
aware of the beauty of that which surrounds them, and of 
the beauty of themselves (Lucas, 1988, p. 15). 
Lucas' vision for a new paradigm in education mirrors 
that of Doll's. For in this paradigm the 
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interconnectedness of all things is supposed. It is 
unfolding and transformative (Lucas, 1988). Doll (1989) 
asserts that the fragmentation of our curriculum 
prohibits us from approaching the complexities of life 
(p. 248). To avoid fragmentation the knower and the 
known must become intertwined (Doll, 1989, p. 248). Thus 
one of the essential messages of the new science, that of 
non-separation, is presented in the holistic vision for 
education. 
Doll's vision of complexity in curriculum moves the 
curriculum from that of simplicity and separateness to 
one of unity (Doll, 1989, p. 248). Students and teachers 
learn to share and understand together (Doll, 1989). 
Transformation vs. Incremental Change 
Doll's final category is that of transformation 
(Doll, 1989). Sorokin (1941, 1947) has postulated that 
the late twentieth century will be an age of transforma-
tion. Like Sorokin, Doll sees this transformation as 
positive, even necessary (Doll, 1989). The Newtonian 
view does not welcome change (Capra, 1982). Change in 
the modern, closed system is discourqged (Doll, 1989, p. 
249r. Doll (1989) states, "Change in a modern, closed 
system is categorically different from change in a post-
modern open system. In Newton's ideal universe, 
stability, not change, was the desired goal" (Doll, 1989, 
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p. 249). Kuhn (1970) feels change is resisted because 
those in power do not benefit from change. 
Quantum physics presents us with a metaphor for 
change. Its paradoxes are centered around the notion of 
change. It encourages us to question old views and to 
create new views. Quantum physics is certainly not about 
stability. Doll (1989) reasons that many have.viewed 
quantum physics as strange, "because it violates our 
normative expectations" (Doll, 1989, p. 249). 
Much of the current discussion concerning curriculum 
is centered on the concept of stability. National 
testing and in gen.eral the back to basics movement, are 
efforts to create stability. However, curriculum based 
on the metaphor of quantum physics must necessarily 
reject such closed thinking. True transformation demands 
innovation not static proposals. Doll (1989) summarized 
the post-modern view of change as transformative not 
r 
incremental (Doll, 1989, p. 249). Doll (1989) states: 
A post-modern view looks upon change in an 
entirely different light. Change is seen in 
transformative, not incremental, terms; and 
errors are seen as necessary actions in the 
process of development--the motors which drive 
development. Allied with this, of course, are 
theories of chaos, uncertainty and confusion 
taking ever increasing roles in the field of 
management, mathematics, political science, 
physics and sociology. (p. 249) 
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Transfor.mative change, according to Sorokin is upon 
us (Sorokin, 1941, 1947). Doll has pointed out that 
changes have already begun to appear in other'areas. 
Curriculum workers need to begin to consider the 
repercussions of these changes on our schools. 
Curriculum workers, like most everyone, have 'tended 
to work from static models. In other words, they proceed 
from that which is "nor.mal". Zukav (1979) referred to a 
paradigm as that which we believe to be true (p. 310). 
He states: "But what we believe to be true is based on a 
myriad of factors. Truth gets caught up in a web of 
interactions" (Zukav, 1979, p. 310). Zukav (1979) 
concludes by telling us that, "What we take to be true is 
our reality" (p. 310) .. Curriculum workers often take to 
be true that which is assumed to be real. Quantum 
physics calls many of those assumptions into question. 
Curriculum theory should not shy away from the 
implications of transformational theory. 
Speculation and Conclusions 
At least one contemporary sociologist agrees with 
Sorokin's concept that our social and cultural institu-
tions are undergoing immense change. Alvin Toffler 
(1990) in his book Power Shift states the following: 
For this is the down of the Powershift Era. We 
live at a moment when the entire structure of 
power that held the world together is now 
disintegrating. A radically different structure 
of power is taking form. And this is happening 
at every level of human society. (p. 3) 
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The essential message of Sorokin's thesis is based upon 
the concept of change. Certainly the momentous events of 
the late twentieth century give us ample reason to ponder 
the validity of his thesis. The collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
incredible social upheaval in the United States are 
changes that defy the measuring rod of the absolutists. 
Change is taking place at a pace which outstrips much of 
our ability to comprehend. 
Curriculum workers are faced with the task of dealing 
with these changes. To remain complacent in the midst of 
such change is to abrogate our duties. Kuhn (1970) 
theorized that many who dare to work from a different 
perspective than that of the dominant paradigm, risk 
becoming outcasts. But to continue in the safe path is 
to uphold policies which are bound to fail. Social 
transformation demands transformation at all levels of 
thought. 
Dobson and Dobson (1981) discuss in their work The 
Language of Schooling the importance of forming a 
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language base in curriculum theorizing. I, too, agree 
that a language base is critical. A language base built 
upon the metaphor of quantum physics appears to be a 
legitimate possibility for curriculum workers. 
Quantum physics addresses the science of 
probabilities. It would also seem to present us with a 
language of possibilities. Quantum physics pushes us 
toward a language base that recognizes the value of all 
of nature. Each child, each human being, is to be viewed 
in the context of the cosmos. In such a view the human 
spirit literally becomes one with the universe. Conse-
quently, no child or human being can be discounted. 
Spirituality and subjectiveness once again find a place 
in the curriculum. Closed systems are merged with open 
systems, and new visions emerge. Positivism gives way to 
possibility. Whitehead protested against "the bifur-
cation of nature into two systems of reality" (Levi, 
1959, p. 269). The new language of quantum physics also 
denies such bifurcation. 
Curriculum workers must necessarily be at the 
forefront of changes in our schools. We have a special 
responsibility to examine the possible repercussions of 
cultural transformation, and then act accordingly. Kuhn 
has alerted us to the fact that paradigm shifts are often 
difficult (1970). Put another way, paradigm shifts are 
apt to anger many people. Curriculum workers whose 
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salaries are paid by those who resist change are not 
likely to consider alternative paradigms of thinking. As 
mentioned earlier, cultural transition does not permit us 
to be so complacent. 
Sorokin has presented us with a picture of a Sensate 
(materialistic-linear) culture that has worn itself out. 
The old school of thinking simply does not work any more. 
New ideas, and broader, more open concepts, are called 
for. Curriculum workers would do well to examine the 
language base from which they work. 
Finally, the language of quantum physics calls forth 
a picture of process and holism. As a metaphor for 
curriculum theorizing, the language of quantum physics 
appears to hold gr~at promise. However, these concepts 
do not lend themselves to immediate identification. It 
may be that we simply do not know what works. Yet, we 
must press forward with,the .search for meaning and 
attempt to create a curriculum grounded in the metaphor 
of holism and process. In short, we must resist the urge 
to make such a metaphor fit into what we already know. 
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